L. Lutfi
Universitas Hayam Wuruk Perbanas

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Credit Risk Determinants in Regional Development Banks: Intermediation, Capital Structure, and Gender Governance Kadek Irma Susanti; L. Lutfi
Golden Ratio of Finance Management Vol. 6 No. 2 (2026): April - September
Publisher : Manunggal Halim Jaya

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.52970/grfm.v6i2.2265

Abstract

This research analyzes how credit growth, capitalization, and profitability influence credit risk in Indonesian Regional Development Banks (Bank Pembangunan Daerah, hereafter BPDs), additionally investigating the moderating influence of female commissioners. Based on Agency Theory and Resource Dependence Theory, it suggests that both financial performance and board governance structures affect banks’ willingness to take risks and their credit risk results. Using a quantitative approach, the study analyzes panel data from 23 conventional BPDs in Indonesia over the 2018–2024 period through panel data regression, generating 161 bank-year observations. The hypotheses are tested using panel data regression with the Random Effects Model (REM), selected through panel model specification tests. The findings indicate that the expansion of loans and the enhancement of profits notably diminish credit risk, suggesting that cautious lending practices and improved financial performance contribute to better credit quality and risk management. Capital adequacy exhibits a positive yet inconsequential link to credit risk, implying that holding more capital may lead to increased risk-taking behavior. The presence of female commissioners does not significantly influence credit risk and does not affect the relationship between loan growth, capital adequacy, or profitability. In summary, the model demonstrates statistical significance and accounts for 17.06% of the variation in credit risk. Female commissioners have minimal impact on credit risk and its relation to financial factors, indicating limited influence of board gender diversity on oversight. The study enriches banking risk literature by showing that female board representation has limited governance impact in emerging-market regional banks without substantial decision-making power.
Credit Risk in Regional Development Banks: The Roles of Operational Inefficiency, Profitability, and Independent Commissioners Iqbal Alfahruli; L. Lutfi
Golden Ratio of Finance Management Vol. 6 No. 2 (2026): April - September
Publisher : Manunggal Halim Jaya

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.52970/grfm.v6i2.2264

Abstract

This study examines the effects of operational inefficiency, profitability, and independent commissioners on credit risk in Indonesian Regional Development Banks (RDBs). Regional Development Banks (RDBs), locally known as Bank Pembangunan Daerah, are provincially owned financial institutions that play a vital role in promoting regional economic development. Credit risk remains a major concern for RDBs because of their strategic intermediation function and their vulnerability to non-performing loans (NPLs). Using panel data from 23 conventional RDBs over the 2018–2024 period, this study analyzes 161 bank-year observations through panel data regression, with the Random Effect Model identified as the most appropriate estimation technique. Credit risk is measured by the non-performing loan (NPL) ratio, operational inefficiency by the operating expense-to-operating income (OEOI) ratio, profitability by return on equity (ROE), and board independence by the number of independent commissioners. The findings reveal that operational inefficiency has a positive and significant effect on credit risk, indicating that lower cost efficiency increases the deterioration of loan quality. In contrast, profitability has a negative and significant effect on credit risk, suggesting that more profitable banks are better able to maintain asset quality and absorb potential losses. Independent commissioners also have a negative and significant effect on credit risk, demonstrating the importance of board independence in strengthening oversight and mitigating risk. However, independent commissioners do not moderate the relationships between operational inefficiency and credit risk or between profitability and credit risk. This study contributes to the banking and corporate governance literature by providing empirical evidence from Indonesian RDBs, an underexplored segment of the banking industry in emerging markets. The findings suggest that, rather than functioning as a moderating mechanism, independent commissioners serve as an important direct governance mechanism for mitigating credit risk. From a practical perspective, RDBs should improve operational efficiency, maintain sustainable profitability, and strengthen board independence to enhance credit risk management and support long-term financial stability.