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Reconstruction of The Definition of An Advocate in The Criminal Justice System based on Certain Qualification Standards Hamka Ferynando; Natsir Asnawi
Asian Journal of Social and Humanities Vol. 4 No. 9 (2026): Asian Journal of Social and Humanities
Publisher : Pelopor Publikasi Akademika

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.59888/ajosh.v4i9.724

Abstract

Amendments to the regulations in Law Number 20 of 2025 concerning the Criminal Procedure Code raise fundamental issues regarding the definition of an advocate, particularly as formulated in Article 1, number 22, which expands the scope of legal service providers beyond professional advocates. This expansion creates a dualism between advocates, who are a profession with specific qualification standards, and non-professionals who are allowed to provide legal services. This situation creates disharmony with Law Number 18 of 2003 concerning Advocates. It has implications for legal uncertainty, degradation of professionalism, and the potential weakening of the protection of suspects' rights in the criminal justice system. This study aims to analyze the normative weaknesses in the definition of an advocate and to formulate a legal reconstruction that guarantees the certainty of qualification standards. The method used is a normative juridical approach, with statutory and conceptual analysis, as well as qualitative analysis through legal interpretation. The research findings indicate that expanding the definition of an advocate without clear qualifications risks obscuring the legitimacy of the advocacy profession as an officium nobile and weakening its function as a counterweight to state power. Legal reconstruction is needed through reaffirming advocacy as a qualification-based profession, strictly separating it from non-advocate legal aid providers, and harmonizing the provisions in the New Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) with the Advocates Law. This approach is expected to maintain a balance between access to legal aid and ensuring the quality of defense, thereby realizing a just and integrity-based criminal justice system.
The Dialectics of Legal Positivism and the Sociological Jurisprudence School in the Regulation of Human Rights under the 1945 Constitution: A Critical Legal Philosophy Analysis Putra Alexander Junior; Ali Topan; Isomudin Bandjar; Natsir Asnawi
LEGAL BRIEF Vol. 14 No. 6 (2026): February: Law Science and Field
Publisher : IHSA Institute

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.35335/legal.v14i6.1599

Abstract

The regulation of human rights in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, particularly Chapter XA, reflects complex dynamics in legal philosophical thought. This study aims to critically analyze the dialectic between legal positivism and sociological jurisprudence in the normative construction of human rights and its implications for constitutional interpretation by the Constitutional Court. The research employs a normative juridical legal method with a critical legal philosophy approach, conducted through a literature review of constitutional norms, relevant statutory regulations, and Constitutional Court decisions related to human rights. The findings indicate that the regulation of human rights in the 1945 Constitution does not represent a single school of legal philosophy, but rather constitutes a paradigmatic synthesis between the normative certainty characteristic of legal positivism and the social responsiveness emphasized by sociological jurisprudence. This philosophical tension is reflected in the variation of interpretive methods adopted by the Constitutional Court, ranging from formalistic to progressive approaches. The study concludes that a constitutional interpretation model based on contextual positivism or responsive formalism is relevant for bridging legal certainty and substantive justice in the protection of human rights in Indonesia