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Ach. Faidi
Universitas 17 Agustus Surabaya
Law, Crime, Criminology & Criminal Justice

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Menguatkan Mekanisme Checks And Balances dalam Sistem Pemerintahan Presidensial Multi Partai di Indonesia Melalui Judicial Review: Judicial Review Zubdatul Munawwarah Zubda; Ach. Faidi
As-Shahifah : Journal of Constitutional Law and Governance Vol. 6 No. 1 (2026)
Publisher : Fakultas Syariah Universitas Islam Madura

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.19105/asshahifah.v6i1.25280

Abstract

The checks and balances mechanism is an integral part of the principle of separation of powers through the concept of trias politica developed by Montesquieu. This idea philosophically emphasizes that state power should not be concentrated in a single organ of power, as this has the potential to give rise to tyranny and abuse of power. In a presidential system of government, the checks and balances mechanism ideally operates through a balanced relationship between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches., but in the practice this relationship is often distorted due to the dominant coalition political configuration. This study formulates two research focuses; what is the nature of the principle of checks and balances ? and how are efforts to strengthen the mechanism of checks and balances through judicial review? This research is a type of normative legal research with several approaches used: the statute approach, the historical approach, the comparative approach, and the conceptual approach. This study found two concluding answers; First, the essence of the checks and balances mechanism in the government system cannot be separated from the conceptual roots of the trias politica doctrine. Second, this study found three main concepts; reconstruction of the institutional design of judicial review, strengthening the Independence of the Constitutional Court, strengthening the binding power and effectiveness of judicial review decisions.
Co-Authors Zubdatul Munawwarah Zubda