Didik Iskandar
Department of Administration Science, Faculty of Social and Law, Makassar State University, Makassar, Indoensia

Published : 3 Documents Claim Missing Document
Claim Missing Document
Check
Articles

Found 3 Documents
Search

External and Internal Institutional Value Structures (Institutional Logics) in Implementing the BerAKHLAK Civil Service Core Values: Evidence from Sorong City Government, Indonesia Atika Rafika; Hasniati Hasniati; Muh. Akmal Ibrahim; Didik Iskandar
Journal Social Civilecial Vol. 3 No. 3 (2025): Journal Social Civilecial
Publisher : Journal Social Civilecial

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar

Abstract

The implementation of the BerAKHLAK civil service core values at Sorong City Government takes place within a plurality of competing institutional logics. Empirical indicators a 2023 Integrity Assessment Survey (SPI) of 58.20 (“vulnerable”), a cross-OPD synergy index of 57/100, digital system adoption below 50%, and 38% of civil servants not understanding BerAKHLAK signal that the internalisation problem is structural and rooted in a complex institutional-logics configuration. This study analyses the institutional value structure underlying BerAKHLAK implementation through the institutional logics framework , covering four dimensions: logic dominance, compatibility with BerAKHLAK values, inter-logic conflict, and balance strategies. A qualitative single-case study approach was employed. Data were collected through in-depth interviews with 34 purposively-selected informants, participant observation across seven OPDs over 48 days, and analysis of 23 official documents. Data were analysed interactively through condensation, display, and conclusion drawing, with source, method, and member-check triangulation. Bureaucratic-hierarchical and relational logics dominate practice, while BerAKHLAK logic remains subordinate and situationally active (only 8–10% in internal decisions vs 30% in externally-monitored situations). Compatibility is low-to-partial, particularly for Accountable, Competent, Adaptive, and Collaborative. Inter-logic conflict is intense (68% of implementing staff experience >3 conflicts/week) with passive resolution patterns (69% silent compromise or passive conformity). Adaptation strategies are dominated by decoupling (71% of OPDs). The dramatic 2025 surge of the Public Service Index to the Highest Green Zone (90.2) without corresponding internal improvement confirms symbolic isomorphic response over substantive value internalisation. Weak BerAKHLAK internalisation in Sorong City results from unmanaged institutional-logics configuration, where interventions stop at the symbolic level without restructuring the logic architecture that shapes bureaucratic practice. Transformation requires a paradigm shift from value socialisation to active institutional-logics management reconfiguring incentive structures, building legitimate conflict-resolution arenas, and developing systemic leadership capacity as skilled logic mediators.
Substituting for the State: Informal Institutions, Retrospective Regularization, and the Limits of Formal Supervision in Indonesian Seaweed Aquaculture Suhadi Suhadi; Badu Ahmad; Muh. Akmal Ibrahim; Didik Iskandar
Journal Social Civilecial Vol. 3 No. 3 (2025): Journal Social Civilecial
Publisher : Journal Social Civilecial

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar

Abstract

The social-ecological systems (SES) framework treats boundary clarity, formal rules, monitoring, sanctions, and institutional capacity as interdependent attributes of durable commons governance and generally assumes that informal institutions complement or nest within formal ones. This article examines a case in which informal institutions instead substitute for formal provision across all five attributes at once. Seaweed cultivation in Nunukan Regency, on Indonesia’s maritime border with Malaysia, expanded from 2,652 to 13,050 ha between 2018 and 2023. Drawing on 71 semi-structured interviews with 62 informants across three coastal sub-districts and four administrative tiers, together with document review, we find every formal attribute weak: no legally enacted zoning, seven of nine regulatory domains without specific rules, no licence held by any of nineteen cultivators interviewed, none of eight water-quality parameters monitored on a schedule, and no formal sanction ever imposed for zoning breach. Informal institutions fill each gap, but unevenly. Substitution is dense in one sub-district, concentrated in a single village in a second, and has collapsed in a third. Two conceptual contributions follow. First, substitution is not a stable equilibrium: it depends on individual leadership and enforceable social sanction, and where either is absent no governance operates at all. Second, we identify retrospective regularization boundaries in practice follow where cultivators place their frames, and the state subsequently ratifies the result which converts spatial planning from a preventive instrument into a legitimating one. Aggregate claims that informal institutions compensate for weak states therefore obscure sharply divergent local outcomes.
Network Governance for Strengthening Coastal Community Economies Based on Blue Economy: Evidence from Southwest Papua Province, Indonesia Rahman Rahman; Muh. Akmal Ibrahim; Sukri Sukri; Didik Iskandar
Journal Social Civilecial Vol. 3 No. 3 (2025): Journal Social Civilecial
Publisher : Journal Social Civilecial

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar

Abstract

Coastal blue-economy governance in Southwest Papua Province involves diverse actors and resources, yet a tight paradox persists between actor plurality and the weakness of equitable and productive relations. Networks have formed empirically through inter-governmental cooperation, conservation funding, and customary practices, but the quality of these relations remains uneven. This study analyses network governance in coastal blue-economy development through Klijn and Koppenjan’s (2000) four-dimensional framework: actors and relations, resources, rules, and perceptions. A qualitative embedded single-case study was conducted in Raja Ampat Regency, Sorong Regency, Tambrauw Regency, and Sorong City. Data were collected through in-depth interviews with 22 purposively-selected informants, participant observation, and document analysis, analysed thematically through open coding, axial coding, actor network mapping, and cross-category synthesis. The policy network has formed but operates with structural asymmetries. Formal bureaucratic actors occupy central positions (94% forum access; 87% agenda influence) while fisher cooperatives remain peripheral (29% and 12%). Resources are concentrated: planners and technical agencies control 87–94% of administrative and informational resources, while customary institutions control 88% of social-normative legitimacy with limited material access. Six regulatory regimes operate in parallel without synchronisation; perceptions diverge sharply between bureaucratic (policy coherence), indigenous (justice), fisher (livelihood), and business (market certainty) frames. The principal challenge is not the absence of actors, forums, or rules, but the architecture of an asymmetric, fragmented network unable to consolidate collective understanding. Strengthening coastal economies through the blue economy requires restructuring relations, redistributing strategic resources, harmonising plural rules, and transforming divergent perceptions into shared understanding.