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All Journal Law Development Journal Journal of Law and Social Politics
Andi Wahyu Wibisana
Universitas Pancasila
Humanities Education Law, Crime, Criminology & Criminal Justice Library & Information Science Social Sciences

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Legal Strategies For Preventing Corruption In The Procurement Of Goods And Services At State-Owned Enterprises Andi Wahyu Wibisana
Law Development Journal Vol 8, No 1 (2026): March 2026
Publisher : Universitas Islam Sultan Agung

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.30659/ldj.8.1.96-123

Abstract

The procurement of goods and services within state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is the sector in Indonesia with the most widespread and recurring corruption, with state losses due to procurement corruption surging from Rp5.3 trillion between 2016 and 2020 to Rp43.33 trillion between 2021 and 2023. The absence of a decrease in corruption figures despite the ongoing strengthening of anti-corruption regulations indicates a fundamental gap in SOE procurement governance. The core issue is the absence of a comprehensive, integrated, and legally binding prevention strategy. At the same time, SOE boards of directors have the full authority to establish procurement procedures independently without equivalent accountability standards. This study employs a normative-dogmatic legal methodology. The findings reveal that procurement fraud in SOEs occurs systematically across all stages of the procurement cycle and across sectors. Furthermore, it is found that fraud prevention fails due to a ‘trifragmentation’ of the system, which undermines the substance of regulations by containing normative gaps, a supervisory structure co-opted by conflicts of interest, and an internal legal culture that is permissive towards gratification. The discussion concludes that the most coherent academic response is to formulate a single binding legal instrument that closes every fraud loophole at every layer of the procurement cycle, restores the independence of internal oversight, and institutionalises anti-corruption cultural transformation as a corporate obligation.
Normative Model for SOE Procurement Contract Disclosure as a Corruption Prevention Strategy in Indonesia Andi Wahyu Wibisana
Journal of Law and Social Politics Vol. 4 No. 3 (2026): Journal of Law and Social Politics
Publisher : Politeknik Siber Cerdika Internasional

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.59261/jlsp.v4i3.156

Abstract

Background: Procurement corruption in Indonesian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) persists through contract manipulation practices, including mark-ups, directed tendering, fictitious entities, and engineered contract addenda. Although Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution and existing laws uphold the principles of transparency and accountability, no operational regulation currently requires SOEs to proactively disclose procurement contracts, addenda, and implementation reports. Objective: This study develops a normative model for SOE procurement contract disclosure as a pre-emptive and systemic strategy for corruption prevention. Methods: This dogmatic normative legal research applies statutory, conceptual, case-based, and comparative approaches. It examines the 1945 Constitution, the SOE Law, the Anti-Corruption Law, the Public Information Disclosure Law, SOE procurement regulations, Information Commission decisions, selected corruption cases involving PLN, Merpati, Pelindo II, and Amarta Karya, as well as international open-contracting standards. The analysis maps legal norms, identifies regulatory gaps, examines fraud patterns, and constructs a model based on Fraud Diamond Theory. Results: The study identifies a gap between transparency principles and enforceable disclosure obligations, enabling contractual secrecy that increases opportunities for fraud and strengthens perpetrators’ capabilities. The proposed model requires the disclosure of principal contracts and addenda, proactive publication through standardized electronic platforms, proportionate protection of legitimate trade secrets through consequence tests, independent verification mechanisms, and graduated administrative sanctions linked to the performance of SOE organs. Conclusion: Procurement contract disclosure should be institutionalized as a binding preventive instrument to strengthen public oversight, mitigate procurement fraud risks, and realize economic democracy as mandated by Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution.
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