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All Journal Melintas An International Journal of Philosophy and Religion
Tristam P. Moeliono
Faculty of Law, Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung, Indonesia
Religion Arts Humanities Languange, Linguistic, Communication & Media Social Sciences

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Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligence: An Axiological Argument Mardohar B. B. Simanjuntak; Tristam P. Moeliono
MELINTAS An International Journal of Philosophy and Religion Vol. 41 No. 1 (2025)
Publisher : Faculty of Philosophy, Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.26593/mijpr.v41i1.26-43

Abstract

The growing autonomy of artificial intelligence systems challenges traditional legal doctrines that assume a strong connection between human agency and technological action. As AI increasingly operates within vehicles, robots, and decision-support infrastructures, harmful outcomes may arise from processes that no single human deliberately controls or can reasonably foresee. This dispersion of causation exposes responsibility gaps that liability, fault, and product-based frameworks are ill-equipped to resolve. Drawing on values central to legal and moral theory, this paper argues for a carefully circumscribed form of AI legal personhood as an instrumental tool for allocating responsibility in a coherent and ethically defensible manner. Even though instrumental personhood can appear counterintuitive to those who hold that recognition presupposes a degree of dignity that AI cannot possess, the analysis distinguishes intrinsic dignity from relational dignity and shows that our treatment of agent-like systems shapes the norms governing human interactions without attributing intrinsic worth to machines. Informed by Kurki’s modular theory of personhood and Harari’s analysis of algorithmic authority, a limited and function-specific legal status could enable autonomous systems to bear civil liability through mandatory insurance and operate as juridical nodes in tort and contract. This model preserves human oversight while acknowledging the de facto agency of advanced AI, thereby aligning responsibility with the technological locus of action and supporting frameworks for fair victim compensation, accountability, stability, and the reinforcement of societal values in environments increasingly shaped by autonomous systems. It is concluded that such a constrained form of AI personhood offers a principled and practical pathway for integrating autonomous systems into the legal order without eroding human dignity and welfare.
Legal Personality of Artificial Intelligence Tristam P. Moeliono; Mardohar Batu Bornok Simanjuntak
MELINTAS An International Journal of Philosophy and Religion Vol. 40 No. 2 (2024)
Publisher : Faculty of Philosophy, Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.26593/mel.v40i2.8648

Abstract

This paper examines the ontology of artificial intelligence (AI) within the context of contemporary society. With the rapid progression of technology, the definition of legal subjects has become increasingly ambiguous, as the technological landscape continues to evolve. The orthodox perspective fails to provide adequate solutions to this problem. An alternative approach, as put forth by Visa A.J. Kurki’s bundle theory offers a potential pathway, yet AI’s intrinsic nature surpasses the minimum thresholds defined by Kurki’s model. The authors propose a periscopic model that explores the interaction between the material world and the virtual or augmented sphere, often referred to as the metaverse. This article contends that the current philosophical foundation of law is both outdated and insufficient, primarily due to the shift from singular to plural forms of agency. AI has transitioned from being purely instrumental or intermediary, as observed in Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI), to autonomous decision-making entities, exemplified by Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Drawing on theoretical insights from Yuval Noah Harari, the paper underscores the need for a new conceptual framework to address AI’s lack of a material entity. In conclusion, the paper asserts that the recognition of AI as legal subjects is an inevitable development.
Co-Authors Mardohar B. B. Simanjuntak Mardohar Batu Bornok Simanjuntak