<![CDATA[This study aims to critically evaluate the intersection of corporate governance failures and legal formalism within Indonesia’s Islamic banking sector. Specifically, it investigates how the phenomenon of "Shariah-compliant capitalism" manifests through financial mimicry and the normalization of fictitious ownership in murabahah contracts. Employing a philosophical hermeneutic approach coupled with an ideological critique, this paper analyzes the operational realities of contemporary Islamic financial contracts. The study integrates agency theory to deconstruct the systemic asymmetry between formal Sharia compliance and the actual implementation of institutional governance. The analysis reveals a structural failure in corporate governance, wherein Islamic banks operate predominantly as passive financiers, neglecting substantive, real-time asset monitoring. This absence of managerial oversight facilitates an isomorphic convergence with conventional banking, reducing the murabahah contract to a mere nominal substitution replacing the term "interest" with "margin." Consequently, the system perpetuates fictitious ownership, prioritizing deontological legal adherence over the teleological objectives (maqasid al-shariah) of socio-economic justice. Policymakers, particularly the Financial Services Authority (OJK) and the National Sharia Board (DSN-MUI), must urgently recalibrate their regulatory frameworks. There is a critical imperative for Sharia Supervisory Boards (SSB) to transcend administrative procedural audits and enforce rigorous, on-ground monitoring of actual contract implementation to curb systemic demoralization. Moving beyond conventional legal or accounting-centric evaluations, this paper provides a robust epistemological critique by linking philosophical anomalies with empirical governance failures. It offers a novel perspective on how institutional and supervisory deficiencies sustain Shariah-compliant capitalism in emerging Islamic financial markets.]]>
