<![CDATA[Harmonization within the criminal justice system remains a fundamental challenge for a rule-of-law state, particularly regarding the distribution of investigative authority among law enforcement agencies. In Indonesia, overlapping investigative jurisdictions between the National Police, the Attorney General’s Office, and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) have persistently generated legal uncertainty, institutional rivalry, procedural inefficiency, and risks to rights protection in criminal proceedings. Previous studies have generally examined this issue as a matter of legislative disharmony, inter-agency coordination, or sectoral ego. This article offers a novel argument that overlapping investigative authority is not merely a technical problem of statutory inconsistency, but a symptom of fragmented constitutional institutional design. Using normative juridical research with statutory, conceptual, and comparative approaches, this study analyzes the roots of jurisdictional overlap and formulates a coherent reconstruction model. The findings show that the absence of clear jurisdictional demarcation and a final, binding mechanism for resolving inter-agency jurisdictional disputes has produced systemic dysfunction at the investigative stage. This article proposes three reconstruction models: Clear Jurisdictional Differentiation, Limited Functional Integration, and Institutional Jurisdictional Adjudication. Among these, Institutional Jurisdictional Adjudication is recommended as the most pragmatic initial model because it can manage operational conflicts while providing a transitional framework for broader legislative synchronization. The study concludes that harmonizing investigative authority requires institutional design reconstruction grounded in legal certainty, accountability, and the integrated criminal justice system.]]>
