<![CDATA[The budget efficiency policy through Presidential Instruction Number 1 of 2025 raises legal issues because its implementation concerns presidential authority, state financial management mechanisms, and central–regional government relations. This study aims to analyze the legal politics of budget efficiency regulation through the Presidential Instruction and its legal implications. The study employs a doctrinal legal method with a normative approach through a literature review of primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials. The results show that the legal politics of the budget efficiency policy are based on political, economic, social, and cultural considerations. The use of a Presidential Instruction represents an administrative instrument that enables the policy to be implemented quickly, uniformly, and effectively through presidential discretionary authority in the form of a beleidsregel. The policy strengthens executive power in determining budget implementation and limits the scope of legislative checks and balances by the House of Representatives (DPR) in implementing the State Budget (APBN). In central–regional relations, the policy indicates a tendency toward recentralization by strengthening central government control over Regional Budgets (APBD) without formally withdrawing regional authority. At the regional level, the policy requires APBD adjustments and affects spending priorities, economic activity, and public service quality. Therefore, effective implementation requires adequate budget evaluation, clear limits on Presidential Instruction use, and more participatory coordination among the central government, DPR, and regional governments.]]>
