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All Journal JURNAL AKUNTANSI KEUANGAN DAN MANAJEMEN
Debora Debora
Trisakti School of Management, Jakarta, Indonesia
Decision Sciences, Operations Research & Management Economics, Econometrics & Finance Mathematics

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Monitoring Mechanisms, Corporate Performance, and Corporate Tax Strategy: An Agency Theory Perspective Debora Debora; Regi Muzio Ponziani; Annisa Kanti; Henryanto Wijaya
Jurnal Akuntansi, Keuangan, dan Manajemen Vol 7 No 4 (2026): September
Publisher : Penerbit Goodwood

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.35912/jakman.v7.n4.p157-171.2026

Abstract

Purpose: This study aims to examine whether monitoring mechanisms, alignment mechanism, and firm characteristics influence corporate tax strategy through corporate performance in Indonesian listed manufacturing companies.Research Methodology: This study employed a quantitative explanatory approach using purposive sampling. The sample consisted of manufacturing companies consistently listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2022–2024, publishing annual financial statements ending on December 31, presenting financial statements in Rupiah, recording profit before and after tax, and reporting CETR values greater than 0 and less than 1. The final dataset comprised 318 firm-year observations and was analyzed using STATA version 17 through panel data regression.Results: The findings show that managerial ownership and sales growth influence corporate performance, while corporate performance shapes corporate tax strategy. Other governance and firm-characteristic variables do not show a direct effect on corporate tax strategy after corporate performance is included. These results strengthen the novelty of this study by showing that corporate tax strategy is better explained through a performance-mediated pathway rather than through direct governance effects alone, thereby contributing to agency-based corporate governance and taxation literature.Conclusions: This study concludes that corporate tax strategy is better explained as a performance-mediated managerial outcome rather than merely as a direct consequence of formal governance mechanisms.Limitations: This study is limited to Indonesian manufacturing companies during the 2022–2024 period.Contributions: This study provides practical insight for regulators, investors, and corporate decision-makers in strengthening governance mechanisms that support performance accountability and responsible tax strategy.
Does the CEO’s Ego Matter Narcissism’s Moderating Effect on Profitability, Distress, Ownership, and Tax Avoidance Annisa Kanti; Nila Pusvikasari; Debora Debora; Fanny Anggraeni; Vinola Herawati
Jurnal Akuntansi, Keuangan, dan Manajemen Vol 7 No 4 (2026): September
Publisher : Penerbit Goodwood

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.35912/jakman.v7.n4.p173-191.2026

Abstract

Purpose: This study examines how profitability, financial distress, and institutional ownership affect corporate tax avoidance among Indonesian manufacturing firms and tests whether CEO narcissism moderates these relationships rather than directly and uniformly driving tax avoidance.Research Methodology: This quantitative study applied purposive sampling to analyze 426 firm-year observations from 142 IDX-listed manufacturing firms (2022–2024), measuring tax avoidance, profitability, distress, ownership, and narcissism using the Effective Tax Rate, Return on Assets, debt-to-equity ratio, institutional shareholding, and Photographic Prominence Index. Moderated Regression Analysis used EViews 13 with a Random Effect ModelResults: Profitability significantly restricts tax avoidance, whereas financial distress and institutional ownership show no significant direct effects. CEO narcissism significantly strengthens the profitability-avoidance relationship but does not moderate distress or ownership pathways.Conclusions: CEO narcissism acts as a selective moderating mechanism, activating only under favorable financial conditions rather than universally.Limitations: This study is limited to Indonesian manufacturers from 2022 to 2024, relying on secondary corporate data.Contributions: This study enriches the behavioral accounting and corporate governance literature and helps tax authorities and boards assess executive leadership governance and tax risks. By introducing selective moderation, this study shows that CEO Narcissism amplifies tax avoidance only under specific financial conditions rather than functioning as a uniform driver, a distinction that constitutes the study’s core theoretical novelty.
Co-Authors Annisa Kanti Fanny Anggraeni Henryanto Wijaya Nila Pusvikasari Regi Muzio Ponziani Vinola Herawati