<![CDATA[This research examines the structural weakening of the Indonesian House of Representatives' (DPR) oversight function in relation to the privatization of public functions within political parties. Using a socio-legal approach that combines doctrinal normative analysis with empirical examination of how law operates in practice (law in action), this study identifies the root cause of parliamentary dysfunction not merely as procedural deficiency but as a systemic problem originating from party governance structures. The research analyzes three interconnected phenomena: (1) the concentration of financial control within political party oligarchies due to inadequate audit mechanisms limited to state-sourced funds, which leaves private funding channels unaccountable; (2) the use of inter-term replacement mechanisms as a tool for political control that constrains legislators' independence in executing oversight functions; and (3) the structural subordination of party members to party elites through patron-client relations. The findings demonstrate that the limitation of state audits under Government Regulation No. 36 of 2018 has created a governance vacuum that allows financial oligarchies to consolidate control, thereby transforming political parties from public institutions into entities operating according to private capital logic. Consequently, legislators become structurally subordinated to party elites, compromising their ability to exercise critical oversight of executive power. This research proposes institutional reconstruction through comprehensive financial audit reforms, restructuring of party courts with independent external elements, and implementation of leadership term limits to restore legislative independence. The solutions offered are implementable, measurable, and aimed at strengthening constitutional democracy through reformed party governance systems.]]>
