<![CDATA[This article examines the concept of time in the metaphysical system of Mullā Ṣadrā (Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī) and compares it with contemporary interpretations of time in quantum theory, particularly those of Carlo Rovelli and Vlatko Vedral. Building on the doctrines of the primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd) and substantial motion (al-ḥaraka al-jawhariyya), the article argues that, in Ṣadrā’s metaphysics, time is neither an independent substance nor a fundamental ontological category. Rather, it is a real but ontologically dependent dimension of material existence, emerging from the dynamic unfolding of wujūd. In this sense, time is inseparable from processes of becoming and grounded in substantial motion, rather than existing as a container or external framework. The study further shows that this position closely parallels contemporary developments in quantum theory, where time is increasingly understood as non-fundamental and relational, arising from physical interactions, correlations, or entanglement rather than serving as a universal background parameter. Through a systematic comparative analysis, the article demonstrates that both Ṣadrā’s philosophy and modern physics converge on a non-substantialist account of time, while differing in their explanatory frameworks and underlying ontologies. It argues that Ṣadrā’s conception provides a philosophically robust model of temporality that can meaningfully contribute to current debates in the metaphysics of time and the philosophy of science, opening a dialogue between classical Islamic thought and contemporary physics without reducing one to the other.]]>
