<![CDATA[This article examines the epistemological structure underlying Abu Hamid al-Ghazali's critique of Peripatetic philosophy as articulated primarily in Tahafut al-Falasifah and complemented by the autobiographical account in al-Munqidz min al-Dalal. The study aims to analyze the epistemological basis of this critique, the argumentative methods employed, and its implications for the development of post-classical Islamic epistemology. A qualitative library-research method is applied through a historical-analytical philosophical approach, examining al-Ghazali's primary texts alongside secondary literature from Muslim and orientalist scholars. The findings show that al-Ghazali's critique did not stem from an absolute rejection of reason, but from a methodological doubt toward the claims of burhan (apodictic demonstration) advanced by Ibn Sina and al-Farabi, particularly concerning twenty metaphysical propositions, three of which were declared to lead to unbelief. Al-Ghazali's argumentation combined dialectic (jadal), reductio-style refutation (ilzam), and the dismantling of premises long regarded as axiomatic. The epistemological crisis that followed the writing of the Tahafut led al-Ghazali toward an epistemology of dzawq (inner taste) affirmed through mukasyafah, without wholly abandoning the authority of discursive reason. This study concludes that al-Ghazali's principal contribution lies in his sharp distinction between logic as a neutral formal instrument and metaphysics as a domain of claims requiring rigorous validation, a distinction that remains relevant for contemporary Islamic epistemology.]]>
