<![CDATA[Abstract: Both Indonesia and South Korea have authoritarian backgrounds that have shaped how their respective constitutions address states of emergency; however, the two countries currently find themselves in very different situations when it comes to addressing abuses of executive power during such situations. This study analyses the constitutional structure of civilian governance during a state of emergency in Indonesia, specifically Article 12 of the 1945 Constitution and Law No. 23 of the 1959 Prp on States of Emergency, in comparison with Article 77 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, which was put to the test during the military emergency declaration issued by President Yoon Suk Yeol in December 2024. Using a normative legal approach and comparative methods, this article demonstrates that the key factor distinguishing the two systems is not the delegation of emergency powers as outlined in the constitution, but rather the strength and efficiency of the parliamentary oversight mechanisms inherent in each. The South Korean Constitution requires the President to terminate a state of military emergency if a majority of the National Assembly requests it. This mechanism ended Yoon’s state of military emergency within six hours and ultimately led to his removal from office by a unanimous Constitutional Court decision in April 2025. In contrast, Indonesian Law No. 23 of 1959 lacks a corresponding legislative termination clause. This shortcoming became apparent during the civil emergency in Maluku and North Maluku, which lasted nearly three years from 2000 to 2003 based solely on a single presidential decree. This article argues that the agenda for reforming Indonesia’s emergency laws—repeatedly attempted and abandoned since the beginning of the reform era—must emphasise binding parliamentary review and judicial oversight rather than merely changing emergency categories. Keywords: Constitutional Law, States of Emergency, Civil Emergencies, Parliamentary Oversight]]>
