<![CDATA[The protection of human life (ḥifẓ al-nafs) occupies a central position within Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah, yet its methodological status in contemporary Islamic legal reasoning remains insufficiently theorised. Existing maqāṣid scholarship generally presents the five essential protections as a relatively parallel framework, leaving unresolved how priorities should be determined when competing interests arise in concrete legal and ethical contexts. This article examines whether ḥifẓ al-nafs can function as a foundational principle of fatwa reasoning while preserving the normative significance of other maqāṣid. Employing a qualitative doctrinal and conceptual approach, the study critically analyses formative maqāṣid literature, contemporary reformulations, and recent scholarship on human dignity, rights, welfare, and bioethical reasoning. The analysis develops a reconstructed hierarchy in which ḥifẓ al-nafs constitutes the foundational layer, encompassing the protection of human existence, bodily integrity, dignity, and basic agency. Ḥifẓ al-dīn, ḥifẓ al-ʿaql, ḥifẓ al-nasl, and ḥifẓ al-māl are positioned as mutually reinforcing protections that sustain the conditions necessary for meaningful and socially viable human life. The categories of ḥājiyyāt and taḥsīniyyāt are subsequently reconceptualised as degrees of necessity and refinement rather than merely parallel lists of objectives. The study contributes a normative framework for resolving maqāṣid conflicts by establishing a presumptive priority for protecting human life and fundamental integrity when grave and demonstrable threats occur, while requiring proportionality, contextual assessment, and evidentiary justification in conflicts involving other interests. The proposed hierarchy is interpretive rather than a claim of classical consensus and is intended to strengthen the methodological foundations of contemporary fatwa reasoning.]]>
