<![CDATA[This study aims to analyze the implications of the open proportional representation system on the quality of political representation in the Indonesian Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD), particularly in relation to the substantive performance of representatives, patterns of relations with constituents, and the dynamics of political nancing. The study uses a qualitative, normative-empirical approach, using analysis of election legislation and literature review of secondary data in the form of DPRD performance reports, publications from election monitoring institutions, and relevant academic literature. The results show that while the open proportional representation system procedurally expands voter choice and strengthens electoral legitimacy, substantively, this system encourages political personalization, intra-party competition, and representatives' orientation toward individual electoral interests. Political representation tends to shift from a substantive model to a narrow, transactional electoral model. Furthermore, this system has implications for increasing political costs, which are correlated with the practice of money politics and a tendency towards political corruption due to pressure to recoup campaign funds. Thus, the open proportional representation system does not automatically improve the quality of political representation in the DPRD but instead operates problematically in the context of weak party institutions and political nancing regulations in Indonesia.]]>
