<![CDATA[Political dynasties remain an important feature of local political competition in Indonesia and raise questions concerning the relationship between concentrated political power and corruption risks. This article examines whether prolonged political control by interconnected political families may weaken institutional checks and public accountability. Using normative juridical and socio-political analysis, the study evaluates local government structures, political recruitment, conflicts of interest, procurement, licensing, and oversight institutions. The article does not assume that political dynasties automatically produce corruption but argues that concentration of political influence may create structural conditions conducive to conflicts of interest and weakened oversight. The study proposes an anti-corruption framework focused on transparency of political connections, beneficial ownership disclosure, conflict-of-interest regulation, independent local oversight, and stronger civic monitoring. Particular attention is given to local governments where executive, legislative, business, and party networks overlap. The article concludes that anti-corruption policy should address structural power relationships rather than focusing exclusively on individual corrupt acts. Strengthening institutional independence and transparency can reduce the risks associated with concentrated political power while preserving citizens' constitutional rights to participate in elections.]]>
