<![CDATA[Indonesia's bankruptcy law, under Article 2(1) of Law No. 37/2004, permits declarations without substantive insolvency testing, prioritizing formal proof (two creditors, one unpaid debt) over economic reality. This crisis-era design, intended for rapid debt resolution now generates constitutional tensions with the Rechtsstaat principle (UUD 1945 Art. 1(3)), legal certainty (Art. 28D(1)), judicial function (Art. 24(1)), and economic democracy (Art. 33(4)). This study employed doctrinal legal research combined with functional comparative analysis across five jurisdictions (the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Thailand, and Singapore), drawing on primary legal sources, judicial decisions, and empirical court data. Doctrinal analysis reveals three asymmetries: evidentiary imbalance, remedial disproportionality, and creditor leverage amplification, which particularly harm MSMEs (61% of GDP, 97% of employment). Empirical patterns (PKPU: bankruptcy ratios 4–7:1, 2021–2024) and cases (Manulife, Telkomsel) confirmed the market perception of unpredictability. Comparative mapping identified four gatekeeping elements shared across credible regimes: objective entry tests (cash-flow/balance-sheet/hybrid), balanced evidentiary burdens, dispute filters, and rescue complements. The study prescribed a hybrid insolvency test for Indonesia, with cash-flow primacy, MSME presumptions, and safe-harbor incentives, restoring proportionality while preserving efficiency. This reform aligns bankruptcy with constitutional commitments, preventing abuse and supporting balanced economic progress.]]>
