<![CDATA[Constitutional Court Decision Number 28/PUU-XXIV/2026, pronounced on 9 February 2026, affirms that the Supreme Audit Board holds the constitutional authority to examine and declare state financial losses under Article 23E paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution. The Attorney General’s Office responded through Circular Letter Number B-1391/F/Fjp/04/2026 dated 20 April 2026, asserting instead that the calculation of state losses may be carried out not only by the Supreme Audit Board but also by the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency, the Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus, and certified public accountants. This interpretive clash generates legal uncertainty at the evidentiary stage of corruption cases. Employing normative juridical research, this article analyses the dualism through the lens of administrative law, focusing on the doctrine of the sources of authority (attribution, delegation, and mandate), the legal status of a circular letter as a policy rule, and the binding force of the legal considerations in a decision whose verdict rejects the petition. The findings reveal that the conflict originates from the gap between an operative verdict that leaves the norm intact and legal considerations that endorse the Supreme Audit Board, granting the prosecution room to interpret differently by relying on Constitutional Court Decision Number 31/PUU-X/2012 and Articles 2 and 3 of the Anti-Corruption Law. The author argues that the solution cannot rest on an internal circular, but demands harmonisation of technical regulation that firmly separates the authority to declare a loss, belonging to the Supreme Audit Board, from the activity of calculating it, which supporting bodies may perform, while preserving the judge as the ultimate arbiter under Article 183 of the Criminal Procedure Code.]]>
