Yuliana Setiadi
Faculty of Law, Universitas Jayabaya, Jakarta, Indonesia

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Reconfiguring Judicial Oversight and Judicial Independence: A Comparative Legal-Political Study of Indonesia and Türkiye Dhoni Martien; Yuliana Setiadi; Necmeddin Güney
PATTIMURA Legal Journal Vol 5 No 2 (2026): August 2026 PATTIMURA Legal Journal
Publisher : Postgraduate Program Doctoral in Law, Universitas Pattimura

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.47268/pela.v5i2.25569

Abstract

Introduction: Judicial oversight is essential to maintaining judicial accountability while protecting judicial independence. However, institutional arrangements may create tensions when external supervision is constitutionally restricted or when oversight powers are concentrated within institutions subject to political influence. Purposes of the Research: This article examines the reconfiguration of judicial oversight in Indonesia and Türkiye and analyzes how constitutional and institutional changes have affected the balance between judicial independence and accountability. Methods of the Research: The study employs normative legal research using comparative, statutory, and conceptual approaches. It analyzes constitutional provisions, legislation, judicial decisions, and institutional arrangements concerning judicial appointments, discipline, and judicial oversight in both jurisdictions. Results Main Findings of the Research: The comparison identifies two distinct institutional pathways. In Indonesia, constitutional adjudication has progressively constrained the external supervisory role of the Judicial Commission, contributing to fragmented judicial accountability and strengthening internal judicial management. In Türkiye, particularly following the 2017 constitutional amendments, the restructuring of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors has concentrated judicial appointment, disciplinary, and career-related powers within a centralized framework characterized by substantial political involvement. These developments demonstrate that weaknesses in judicial accountability may arise through different institutional mechanisms: fragmentation of external oversight and centralization of oversight under politically influenced arrangements. This study contributes to comparative judicial-governance scholarship by distinguishing institutional fragmentation and oversight centralization as two pathways through which judicial accountability may be weakened. It suggests that effective judicial governance requires independent oversight institutions, clearly defined jurisdiction, transparent procedures, and safeguards against both judicial self-insulation and political interference.