The establishment of the State-Owned Enterprises Regulatory Agency (BP BUMN) and the Daya Anagata Nusantara Investment Management Agency (BPI Danantara) under Law No. 16 of 2025 on State-Owned Enterprises marks a significant change in the institutional design of SOE management in Indonesia. This restructuring separates regulatory and supervisory functions from the separate function of managing state investments, with the aim of strengthening governance and enhancing the professionalism of SOE management. However, from an administrative law perspective, this separation has the potential to create a dualism of authority and overlapping functions among institutions. This study aims to analyze the legal status of the State-Owned Enterprises Regulatory Agency (BP BUMN) and the Danantara Investment Agency (BPI Danantara) within the government’s administrative institutional system, as well as to examine potential conflicts of authority arising in the practice of SOE management. The research method employed is normative legal research using a statutory approach and a conceptual approach. The study’s findings indicate that, although there has been a normative separation of the functions of the regulator and the investment manager, there remains an overlap of authority that has the potential to create legal uncertainty, particularly in strategic policymaking, the management of segregated state assets, and the implementation of Public Service Obligations (PSO). Therefore, clearer regulations are needed regarding the boundaries of authority, coordination mechanisms, and accountability frameworks for these two institutions to ensure alignment with the principles of legality, legal certainty, and good governance within Indonesia’s administrative system.