<![CDATA[This study examines legislative dynamics during presidential and parliamentary transition periods (lame-duck sessions) in Indonesia to address two questions: (1) how do political configurations shape the enactment of the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law by the President and the Law by the DPR during transitions, and (2) what are the constitutional and fiscal implications of legal products enacted during such transitions? Prior studies (Gultom, 2019; Perdana, 2024; Pratama and Tyaningrum, 2024) examined aspects of transitional lawmaking but did not synthesise them into a comparative analysis across different transition periods. This study bridges that gap by comparing the issuance of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law No. 1 and 2 of 2014 with the enactment of Law No. 61 of 2024 on State Ministries. Employing normative legal research with historical, comparative, and conceptual approaches, the study finds that the 2014 instruments emerged from a confrontational configuration, functioning as an executive corrective mechanism against the legislature at the time of issuance, before the DPR subsequently enacted them into law. Law No. 61 of 2024, by contrast, emerged from a collusive-facilitative collaboration among the incumbent president, the DPR, and the president-elect. Rather than weakening during the lame-duck period, executive power under Jokowi intensified and was institutionally transferred to his successor, reinforcing autocratic legalism. The study recommends legislative limits on transitional lawmaking and stronger parliamentary oversight, and contributes to comparative literature on democratic backsliding through legal means, offering an empirical case relevant to similar research elsewhere.]]>
