Riaji Kurniadin
Faculty of Law, University of Dr. Soetomo

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The Dangers of Hegemonic Coalition: Analyzing Legislative Capture and Judicial Independence in Emerging Democracies Riaji Kurniadin; Faizah Al Habsyi; Yovan Iristian
Lex Journal: Kajian Hukum & Keadilan Vol 10 No S1 (2026): Special Issue
Publisher : Faculty of Law, University of Dr. Soetomo

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.25139/lex.v10iS1.12665

Abstract

This study examines how hegemonic coalitions drive democratic backsliding in emerging democracies by capturing legislative assemblies and subverting judicial independence. Modern autocratic consolidation increasingly eschews overt military coups in favor of legal, institutional mechanisms executed through broad elite alliances. Utilizing a comparative constitutional and legal-institutional analytical framework, this paper investigates the mechanisms through which oversized ruling coalitions co-opt legislative assemblies and neutralize judicial oversight. The findings reveal that hegemonic coalitions execute legislative capture through party cartelization, selective patronage, procedural manipulation, and the suppression of deliberative lawmaking. Concurrently, judicial independence is eroded through autocratic legalism, abusive constitutional borrowing, court-packing, and executive control over prosecutorial and appointment mechanisms. This dual-capture strategy establishes an institutional framework where democratic facades are preserved while horizontal checks and balances are structurally dismantled. To counter these systemic threats, democratic systems must fortify substantive constitutional guarantees, enforce strict judicial recusal and ethics standards, and cultivate civil society counter-narratives to protect constitutional integrity.