<![CDATA[The development of constitutional law in Indonesia in recent years has shown the increasing vulnerability of the Constitutional Court to political influence, particularly through the dismissal of Constitutional Justice Aswanto before the end of his term, amendments to the Constitutional Court Law, and Constitutional Court Decision Number 90/PUU-XXI/2023 concerning the age requirements for presidential and vice-presidential candidates. This study aims to analyze patterns of constitutional capture of the Constitutional Court and formulate a model of constitutional protection that can strengthen the institution's independence. This research is doctrinal legal research using statutory, conceptual, case, and comparative approaches. The legal materials used consist of laws and regulations, Constitutional Court decisions, journal articles, books, and research reports, analysed qualitatively using prescriptive-analytical methods. The results show that constitutional capture of the Constitutional Court occurs through three main patterns: appointment capture, recall capture, and political loyalty capture. These three patterns are made possible by the ambiguous relationship between the proposing institution and the constitutional justices, weak constitutional tenure protection, the dominance of political branches of power in the process of filling judicial positions, and the absence of an independent institution to conduct the selection of constitutional justices. To address these issues, this study proposes the reconstruction of constitutional protection through strengthening constitutional tenure protection, establishing an Independent Constitutional Court Selection Commission, and developing a constitutional safeguard mechanism to prevent constitutional capture of the Constitutional Court in Indonesia.]]>
