<![CDATA[Israeli–Palestinian negotiations remain constrained by their limited capacity to address the roots of the conflict. This study examines how an apparently available space for compromise in Israeli–Palestinian negotiations can be evaluated through the concepts of the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) and positive peace. The central problem is to identify when a historically recurring space for compromise turns into a Pseudo-ZOPA, namely a bargaining space that appears productive but does not generate structural transformation. The study employs a qualitative approach based on library research, critical-conceptual analysis, and directed qualitative content analysis. Rather than presupposing that freedom of movement, access to holy sites, and prisoner releases are technical compromises, the study treats them as recurrent areas of proposed compromise and then tests them through three positive-peace indicators: reduction of structural injustice, expansion of political recognition, and contribution to conflict transformation. The analysis of Oslo II, Camp David 2000, the Annapolis 2007–2008 process, and recent ZOPA mapping demonstrates a distinction between substantive ZOPA that engages final-status issues but fails to be consolidated, and technical ZOPA that may reduce tensions without necessarily transforming the roots of conflict. The study concludes that Pseudo-ZOPA is useful for explaining compromises that appear procedurally productive but remain non-transformative for positive peace.]]>
