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All Journal Bacarita Law Journal
Dyah Permata Budi Asri
Faculty of Law, Universitas Esa Unggul, Jakarta, Indonesia.

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The Legal Position of Participating Interest in Oil and Gas Production Sharing Contract as Bankruptcy Estate Tony Basoeki Soelistyo; Dyah Permata Budi Asri; Irmanjaya Thaher
Bacarita Law Journal Vol 7 No 1 (2026): August (2026) BACARITA Law Journal
Publisher : Programs Study Outside the Main Campus in Law Pattimura University ARU Islands Regency

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.30598/bacarita.v7i1.26936

Abstract

Bankruptcy law in Indonesia subjects all of a debtor's assets to a general enforcement regime for the benefit of creditors. This becomes more complicated when the asset in question is a Participating Interest (PI) in an oil and gas Production Sharing Contract (PSC), which operates under the constitutional framework of State control over natural resources and a strict public licensing regime. This article examines two questions: whether PI in an oil and gas PSC qualifies as part of the bankruptcy estate (boedel pailit) under Indonesian bankruptcy law, and how restrictions on PI transfers based on the principle of State control affect estate administration and the satisfaction of creditors' claims. The research employs a normative legal method combining statutory, conceptual, and limited case approaches, drawing on legislation, court decisions, and administrative documentation of PI transfer practice. The analysis finds that PI is an intangible contractual-economic right with measurable financial value that is not expressly excluded by statute, therefore it qualifies as part of the bankruptcy estate, and its transfer remains subject to State approval as lex specialis in the oil and gas sector. An examination of two cases and two administrative events shows that how the State exercises its approval power determines whether creditor protection remains within the rechtsstaat or drifts toward machtsstaat. The absence of explicit approval criteria leaves wide discretion in the State's hands. This directly undermines legal certainty for creditors and exposes a persistent tension between public control and private rights.