<![CDATA[Indonesia's criminal procedural reform under Law No. 20 of 2025 on the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) introduces the Guilty Plea (Plea Bargain) mechanism as a new instrument intended to address the need for expeditious, simplified, and low-cost case resolution. The introduction of this mechanism raises fundamental questions concerning its position within a criminal justice system rooted in the civil law tradition, as well as its consistency with the principle of justice and the doctrine of due process of law. This study examines the regulatory framework and juridical standing of the plea bargaining concept within Indonesia's criminal justice system, and evaluates whether its implementation is consistent with the principle of justice and due process of law. The study employs normative legal research using the statute approach, the conceptual approach, and a limited comparative approach, analyzed qualitatively through legal reasoning and interpretation. John Rawls's Theory of Justice and Gustav Radbruch's Theory of Legal Certainty serve as the principal analytical frameworks. The findings indicate that the guilty-plea mechanisms codified in Articles 78, 205, and 234 of the KUHAP constitute three distinct arrangements that have not yet coalesced into a unified plea bargaining regime comparable to that of common law jurisdictions, but rather represent a selective adaptation that preserves the judge's active role and the orientation toward material truth. With respect to consistency with justice and due process of law, the implementation of guilty pleas is capable of achieving alignment where voluntariness of the admission, access to counsel, and substantive judicial oversight are consistently observed, yet risks departing from both principles where the imbalance between the defendant and the public prosecutor, procedural pressure, and the absence of detailed implementing regulation are left unchecked. The study concludes that more detailed implementing regulations and rigorous judicial supervision are required to prevent the guilty-plea mechanism from reducing substantive justice to mere procedural efficiency.]]>
