Rizki Tri Anugrah Bhakti
Fakultas Hukum, Universitas Riau Kepualauan, Kota Riau, Indonesia

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RECONSTRUCTION OF BANK INDONESIA'S INDEPENDENCE AFTER THE P2SK LAW AND THE 2026 AMENDMENT LAW: BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE RISK OF INSTITUTIONAL INTERVENTION Selamat Kristian H; Rizki Tri Anugrah Bhakti; Dwi Afni Maileni
Awang Long Law Review Vol. 9 No. 1 (2026): Awang Long Law Review
Publisher : Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Hukum Awang Long

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.56301/awl.v9i1.2432

Abstract

This study analyzes the reconstruction of Bank Indonesia's Independence after the enactment of Law No. 4 of 2023 concerning the Development and Strengthening of the Financial Sector and Law No. 4 of 2026 concerning Amendments to Law No. 4 of 2023. The main issue examined: "Whether the strengthening of accountability, coordination, institutional evaluation, and budgetary supervision of Bank Indonesia is still within reasonable democratic control limits or has opened up space for intervention against the independence of the central bank". This study uses normative legal research methods with legislative, conceptual, and historical approaches. The analysis is carried out through four dimensions of central bank independence, including goal independence, instrument independence, personal independence, and financial independence. This study argues that the P2SK Law and the 2026 Amendment Law do not formally remove Bank Indonesia's independence, but shift the character of its independence from a relatively autonomous technocratic independence model to an independence model that is more conditioned by political accountability and institutional supervision. The most pronounced shift is seen in the "objective and financial" dimensions, while the relative independence of "instruments and personal" is maintained. Therefore, a firm interpretation limit is needed so that strengthening accountability does not turn into an intervention in the substance of monetary policy, payment systems, and macroprudential.