<![CDATA[The integration of electoral oversight and dispute adjudication within the institutional structure of the General Elections Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) has once again become a subject of debate ahead of the 2029 General Election. The debate primarily concerns potential conflicts of interest and compliance with due process of law, prompting proposals to separate oversight and adjudicatory functions. This study aims to reaffirm Bawaslu’s quasi-judicial character as a basis for integrating these two functions while formulating an institutional strengthening model. This study employs normative legal research using statutory, conceptual, and case approaches. The analysis examines the legal framework governing Bawaslu’s authority, the concepts of electoral justice and quasi-judicial authority, and the evolving institutional design of electoral law enforcement. The findings demonstrate that the integration of oversight and adjudication has philosophical, legal, and sociological legitimacy. Philosophically, functional integration supports the principle of speedy electoral justice within a time-sensitive electoral process. Legally, Bawaslu’s quasi-judicial character forms part of an institutional design that is constitutionally permissible and established through legislation. Sociologically, Bawaslu also enjoys a relatively high level of public trust. Nevertheless, functional integration should not be maintained in a static form. This study proposes an institutional strengthening model based on differentiated competency standards, the establishment of an Oversight Chamber and an Adjudication Chamber, and reform of the decision-making mechanism to prevent role conflicts. Accordingly, what should be separated is not the institution itself, but its functions and processes, thereby preserving institutional integration while strengthening Bawaslu’s independence, impartial]]>
