<![CDATA[Abstract The right to access information is a fundamental right subject to derogation. The Public Information Openness Law (UU KIP) balances the need for easy access to information with restrictions based on principles of confidentiality and limited disclosure. It is alleged that Article 17(d) of the UU KIP—which governs exceptions regarding the disclosure of natural resource wealth—fails to fully satisfy material aspects; this renders its legal content ambiguous and open to subjective interpretation by the relevant Public Bodies. This study aims to examine the fulfillment of material aspects in Article 17(d) by applying the theory of the rule of law, principles of sound legislation, and empirical findings. A normative-juridical approach is employed, focusing on the UU KIP and related regulations, with results presented descriptively. The study reveals that the absence of an explanation regarding the disclosure of natural resource wealth indicates a failure to meet material requirements. The legality and clarity of the legal norm formulated in Article 17(d) require refinement. The failure to satisfy material principles regarding the phrase "excepted public information" conflicts with the *lex certa* principle, which posits that the clarity of legal norms is a guarantee of legal certainty. Furthermore, designating information as "excepted" without following proper procedural "consequence tests" renders the designation legally flawed; this exposes the Information and Documentation Management Officer (PPID) to administrative sanctions from the Information Commission (KIP) and erodes public trust in public bodies that fail to conduct consequence tests in accordance with proper procedures. Keywords: UU KIP, public openness, excepted information, consequence test, *lex certa*]]>
