Islamic family law has undergone a continuous transformation from classical fiqh into modern statutory instruments, yet virtually every reform initiative has encountered resistance from within Muslim societies themselves. Resistance is understood here not as the failure of reform but as the organised contestation that delayed, narrowed, or redirected reforms that were nonetheless enacted. This article examines the grounds on which Muslim communities in Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Middle East have resisted the reform of Islamic family law, and analyses that resistance through Pierre Bourdieu's theory of social practice. The study adopts a socio-legal approach and employs qualitative, descriptive, and analytical library research, drawing on primary and secondary legal materials examined through content analysis and read sociologically, historically, and comparatively. The findings indicate that reform has proceeded both through codified legislation and through judicial determination, whereas resistance has clustered around four recurring issues: the compulsory registration of marriage, the regulation of polygamy, the minimum age of marriage, and the procedural control of divorce. Applying Bourdieu's generative formula (habitus x capital) + field = practice, the article demonstrates that such resistance is neither emotional nor irrational but a structured social practice. An internalised religious habitus treats classical fiqh as sacred and immutable; the cultural, social, and symbolic capital concentrated in the hands of the ulama and Muslim mass organisations legitimises and mobilises opposition; and the religious, legislative, and political fields supply the arenas in which that opposition is enacted. The study contributes a relational explanatory framework that moves beyond the predominantly normative and historical accounts of earlier scholarship, and implies that reform strategies must engage habitus, capital, and field simultaneously.