M. Nurabain Nazarbayev
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Regional Elections Without Deputy Regional Heads: Authority Allocation Issues and Relationship Reconstruction in Indonesian Governance Muhammad Fathir Al Farisi Al Farisi; M. Nurabain Nazarbayev; A. Putra Alen Pratama; Augusto Rischy Tandirapang; R. Nayla Shafa Khumairah Suryakusumah
Tarumanagara Law Review Vol. 8 No. II (2026): Talrev-Untar
Publisher : Faculty of Law Tarumanagara University

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.24912/talrev.v8iII.38783

Abstract

The discourse on holding regional head elections without deputy regional heads has once again raised fundamental questions concerning the design of regional leadership and the distribution of authority within local government. The main issue is not merely the existence of the deputy regional head position, but the imbalance between the electoral legitimacy jointly obtained by regional heads and deputy regional heads as a pair and the legal construction of authority that makes the regional head the primary holder of governmental authority. In contrast, the deputy regional head primarily serves in an assisting role. This study analyzes the problems in the distribution of authority between regional heads and deputy regional heads in the context of the discourse on regional head elections without deputy regional heads. It proposes a clearer, legally grounded, and accountable reconstruction of their institutional relationship and distribution of authority. This study uses a normative-empirical legal research method, drawing on statutory, conceptual, and case approaches. The findings indicate that unclear boundaries of authority create room for political agreements and personal-political dynamics to influence the distribution of roles, potentially causing legal uncertainty and institutional disharmony. Abolishing the deputy regional head position does not necessarily resolve these problems, as it may instead create new issues around workload distribution, succession mechanisms, coordination, and continuity of government. Therefore, a reconstruction is required to clarify the sources and limits of authority, establish the distribution of duties through formal instruments, strengthen measurable coordination and accountability mechanisms, and position political agreements solely as coordination instruments rather than sources of authority.