<![CDATA[The oversight and enforcement of the code of ethics for constitutional judges have evolved throughout history, culminating in the recent establishment of the Honorary Council of the Constitutional Court (MKMK) as a permanent body. However, significant weaknesses persist. These include structural dependencies, such as its reliance on administrative staff seconded from the Constitutional Court and its institutional positioning within the Court’s framework. This research employs a normative juridical method, utilizing statutory, regulatory, and contextual approaches. The findings indicate that the legal policy governing the supervision and enforcement of ethics for constitutional judges has undergone three distinct phases of change. While the MKMK is now institutionally permanent, it faces several challenges related to its independence, its limited and passive authority, a membership recruitment process that does not adhere to a merit system, and its dependence on seconded human resources. Therefore, to fortify the ethical oversight mechanism for constitutional judges, this research proposes a two-pronged approach. First, it is necessary to reconstruct the MKMK’s position as a truly independent supervisory and enforcement body by separating it institutionally from the Constitutional Court and strengthening its authority. Second, the authority of the Judicial Commission (KY) should be restored, allowing it to function as the primary ethical oversight institution for all state officials exercising judicial power, including constitutional judges.]]>
