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Mykhailo Shavkun
Dnipro State University of Internal Affairs

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Foreign Experience of Judicial Self-Governance Models: Criminal Law Aspect Mykhailo Kulyk; Anton Pukas; Iryna Shylo; Mykhailo Shavkun; Anna Nadtochyieva
Jurnal Cita Hukum Vol. 14 No. 2 (2026): Summer Edition
Publisher : Fakultas Syariah dan Hukum, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.15408/jch.v14i2.54698

Abstract

Who protects a judge from pressure, and who decides whether a judge may be arrested? This paper looks for answers in twelve foreign legal orders, from Denmark and Sweden to Romania and the United States, and compares them with Ukraine. Our sources are of three kinds: constitutions, penal codes and procedural rules, coded by the authors; global and European indicators, namely the WJP index for 2025 and Eurobarometer data published by the European Commission in 2025; and figures released by Ukraine's own judicial governance body. We group the jurisdictions into four families, labelled here as council-centred, agency-centred, executive-centred and judge-led. The family a country belongs to decides which institution filters penal cases against members of the bench (a council, a disciplinary tribunal, a court of another district or simply the prosecutor) and whether self-governing bodies have any formal duty to react when a judge is pressured. Within the ten EU states for which both measures exist, the rule-of-law score moves almost in step with how citizens rate court independence (Pearson r = .90; p < .001); the agency-centred systems lead on both counts (0.857 and 77.7 per cent). Ukrainian data show 190 matters of alleged pressure examined between January and September 2024 and personal security arrangements for 27 judges. We conclude that penal safeguards for judges work only where the gatekeeping body is itself insulated from politics, where offences connected with judicial misconduct are narrow and precise, and where consent procedures are open to scrutiny. Concrete amendments to Articles 376-380 of the Ukrainian penal code and to the procedure of the national council are suggested.