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Reformulating Indonesian Plea Bargaining: Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion and Judicial Corruption Through Judicial Oversight Jeffry Pratama; Rahadi Wasi Bintoro
AL-MANHAJ: Jurnal Hukum dan Pranata Sosial Islam Vol. 8 No. 2 (2026)
Publisher : Fakultas Syariah INSURI Ponorogo

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.37680/almanhaj.v8i2.10512

Abstract

This study aims to examine the institutional risks arising from prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining and to formulate a model of judicial control that safeguards judicial independence, transparency, and public accountability. Employing normative legal research, this study applies statutory, conceptual, comparative, and case approaches to analyze the allocation of authority between prosecutors and judges in plea negotiations. The findings indicate that the absence of mandatory judicial verification, substantive judicial review, and adequate transparency mechanisms creates structural opportunities for opaque negotiations, unequal bargaining power, and transactional abuse, particularly where prosecutorial discretion is insufficiently constrained. These weaknesses may shift plea bargaining from a regulated procedural mechanism to a transactional process that compromises the integrity of the criminal justice system. This study proposes a Judicially Controlled Plea Bargaining Model based on four safeguards: mandatory judicial verification, substantive judicial review, transparency requirements, and judicial authority to reject agreements that contravene legality, fairness, or public interests. The model provides a normative framework for reconciling procedural efficiency with judicial independence, institutional integrity, and an accountable criminal justice system.