Widianingrum
UPN "Veteran", Jakarta, Indonesia

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Constitutional Disobedience in the Practice of Concurrent Office-Holding by Deputy Ministers: Non-Compliance with Constitutional Court Decision No. 80/PUU-XVII/2019 and a Proposed Compliance Oversight Mechanism Khofifah Hasanah Pane; Widianingrum; Irsyaf Marsal; Kaharuddin
Journal of Law, Politic and Humanities Vol. 6 No. 6 (2026): (JLPH) Journal of Law, Politic and Humanities
Publisher : Dinasti Research

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.38035/jlph.v6i6.3968

Abstract

Constitutional Court Decision No. 80/PUU-XVII/2019 established in its legal reasoning that the prohibition against concurrent office-holding applicable to ministers also extends to deputy ministers. Nevertheless, the government failed to implement this interpretation, relying on the position that the binding legal force of Constitutional Court decisions is confined to their operative provisions. Several years later, Constitutional Court Decision No. 128/PUU-XXIII/2025 expressly incorporated this prohibition into its operative provisions while reaffirming the binding legal force of the reasoning articulated in Decision No. 80/PUU-XVII/2019. This article examines the normative relationship between these two decisions, analyzes the government's non-compliance during the 2020–2025 period through the lens of constitutional disobedience, and proposes an oversight mechanism to strengthen compliance with Constitutional Court decisions. Employing normative juridical research, this study adopts statutory, case-based, and conceptual approaches. The findings reveal three principal conclusions. First, the legal reasoning underpinning Decision No. 80/PUU-XVII/2019 constitutes a binding ratio decidendi. Accordingly, Decision No. 128/PUU-XXIII/2025 primarily serves to reaffirm the existing constitutional norm and eliminate interpretive ambiguities rather than establish a new legal obligation. Second, the government's conduct demonstrates a pattern of constitutional non-compliance that is more appropriately characterized as non-compliance grounded in unilateral legal interpretation than as overt defiance of the Constitutional Court's authority. Third, the absence of adequate institutional instruments to ensure the implementation of Constitutional Court decisions underscores the need for a comprehensive compliance oversight mechanism encompassing systematic monitoring, mandatory reporting obligations, and graduated sanctions.