<![CDATA[ABSTRACT; House of Representatives (DPR) commissions increasingly invite law enforcement officials, victims, and other parties to discuss cases that are still under adjudication and have not yet reached a final, legally binding status. This practice is often framed as the exercise of the House’s oversight function; however, the discussions frequently delve into specific facts, evidence, and even the prosecution’s demands in concrete cases. This article examines the threshold at which such summonses remain a legitimate form of oversight versus when they cross into "legislative overreach" that infringes upon the independence of the judiciary. Employing a normative-juridical methodology, this study utilizes statutory, conceptual, and case-based approaches. The findings indicate that while the 1945 Constitution and the Law on the Composition and Status of the MPR, DPR, DPD, and DPRD (UU MD3) direct the House’s oversight toward institutional policy and performance—rather than the assessment of individual cases—there is no explicit written rule prohibiting the discussion of ongoing litigation. This regulatory gap allows public hearings to devolve into forums that resemble judicial proceedings, potentially shaping public opinion prior to a verdict and exerting pressure on judges and public prosecutors. This article proposes five parameters to distinguish legitimate oversight from legislative overreach—namely, the object, timing, substance, output, and impact—and suggests incorporating a *sub judice* rule into the House’s Rules of Procedure to ensure that oversight can continue without interfering with the judicial process.]]>
