Everest Nabha Budi Kharisma
Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Ampel

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Why Paper Persisted: Historical Institutionalism and ACE 35’s Digitalization Delay Ilham Dary Athallah; Hayara Khairia; Tsabita Husna; Andi Zakarsyih Nur; Everest Nabha Budi Kharisma
Neo Journal of economy and social humanities Vol 5 No 3 (2026): Neo Journal of Economy and Social Humanities
Publisher : International Publisher (YAPENBI)

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.56403/nejesh.v5i3.544

Abstract

This article explains why Annex 13 of ACE 35, the rules-of-origin regime governing preferential trade between Chile and MERCOSUR, was fully modernized only in 2025 despite earlier regional capacity for digital certification. This paper argues that the delay was not a simple matter of technical incapacity or low commercial relevance. It was the product of a path-dependent institutional equilibrium built around paper certificates, certifying entities, and verification routines that remained legally serviceable long after they had become functionally dated. The study uses a qualitative, explanatory design grounded in historical institutionalism and process tracing. It reconstructs the sequence from the 1996 entry into force of ACE 35 through the ALADI-wide development of digital origin certification, pandemic-era tolerance for digital practices, and the eventual 2025 reform moment. The findings show a three-part pattern. First, Annex 13 remained stable because paper-based certification was embedded in a wider legal and administrative ecology that generated increasing returns. Second, changing trade and regulatory conditions created drift: formal rules stayed in place while digital workarounds and wider regional standards advanced around them. Third, reform took place only when accumulated mismatch, regional precedent, and renewed political attention converted a technical matter into a negotiable item on the bilateral-regional agenda. The paper contributes to International Relations scholarship by showing how historical institutionalism can explain slow change in trade law below the level of headline treaty bargaining.