Nwoye Leonard
University of Calabar

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Ofo na Ogu Contra Rawls: Justice, Innocence and the Limits of the Original Position Nwoye Leonard
Pinisi Journal of Social Science Vol 5, No 2 (2026)
Publisher : Universitas Negeri Makassar

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.26858/pjss.v5i2.90401

Abstract

Rawls's theory of justice as fairness rests on a thought experiment. Rational parties behind a veil of ignorance, ignorant of their place in society, choose principles to govern their association, and the principles they choose are taken to be just because they are chosen under conditions that model impartiality. The device has been enormously influential, and it has shaped the terms in which distributive justice is debated in African political philosophy as much as in the West. This paper argues that the Rawlsian framework, whatever its power as a theory of distribution, cannot perform the adjudicative work that the Igbo principle of Ofo na Ogu takes as central. Rawlsian justice is distributive: it asks how benefits and burdens should be allocated among parties whose claims are already settled by the original position. Ofo na Ogu is adjudicative in a different sense: it asks whether a particular claimant, in a particular dispute, has clean hands, and whether the authority judging her is itself accountable. The paper distinguishes between hypothetical adjudication, in which abstract parties select principles of entitlement under idealised conditions, and actual adjudication, in which concrete parties contest their entitlements under real conditions. It argues that Rawls offers an account of the first and not the second, and that the second cannot be derived from the first. The paper concedes that Rawlsian theory is powerful within its domain and that some existing critiques have challenged its distributive framework more broadly; its own critique is narrower and more specific. It applies the argument to Nigerian constitutional practice, where distributive settlements such as federal character, revenue allocation and amnesty programmes have repeatedly failed to resolve adjudicative questions about who has legitimate claims and whose hands are clean. Its contribution is to establish Ofo na Ogu as a framework that addresses a question the dominant Western theory does not, and to explain why that question is prior.