<![CDATA[The assumption that a defendant's absence in domestic violence (DV) cases is always attributable to fear, coercion, or helplessness constitutes an empirically unsubstantiated generalization. In many instances, such absence may indeed reflect a voluntary waiver of the right to defend oneself, an implicit acknowledgment of the validity of the plaintiff's claims, or even a strategic maneuver to prolong divorce proceedings and inflict continued psychological distress upon the plaintiff. This study examines the judicial reasoning in Verdict Number 1074/Pdt.G/2025/PN Tng concerning a default divorce judgment rendered on grounds of domestic violence and adultery. Employing normative legal research methods through statutory and case approaches, this study aims to assess the conformity of the judicial considerations with the principles of legal certainty and substantive justice. The findings reveal that from a normative-procedural perspective, the a quo decision complied with prevailing civil procedural law and substantive marriage law. The judge duly conducted proper summons, applied Article 125 HIR/149 RBg, and grounded the ruling on Article 39 of the Marriage Law juncto Article 19 letters a and f of Government Regulation Number 9 of 1975. Accordingly, the decision is free from procedural defects or errors in legal application. However, from a sociological-substantive perspective, the verdict fails to fully realize a comprehensive sense of justice. The judicial consideration remains proceduralistic and passive, failing to exercise inherent judicial authority to order additional examinations aimed at uncovering material truth. The evidentiary process concerning domestic violence and adultery proceeded unilaterally without adequate verification mechanisms. Furthermore, the judge neglected to reference the Domestic Violence Elimination Act (Law Number 23 of 2004) as a basis for systematic interpretation and omitted consideration of post-divorce victim recovery as mandated by the Act. This study recommends a reformulation of evidentiary standards in default judgments involving domestic violence and adultery, encompassing mandatory additional examinations, integration of the Domestic Violence Elimination Act perspective, consideration of victim recovery, and the development of specialized judicial guidelines.]]>
