The advent of low-cost loitering munitions has revolutionized modern warfare,creating a profound economic imbalance between offensive and defensive capabilities. In the Middle East, the deployment of Iran's Shahed-136 drone against Israel's Iron Dome defense system serves as a prime example of a "cost-imposing" strategy in asymmetric warfare. Objective: This study aims to quantify the economic disproportion between the production and deployment costs of the Shahed-136 drone and the operational costs of the Iron Dome system. It explores how this cost ratio impacts long-term national defense budgets andstrategic sustainability. Methodology: This study uses a qualitative-descriptive approach supported by comparative economic modelling. Data are synthesized from defense budget reports, estimates of the Shahed-136 manufacturing costs, and the unit cost of the Iron Dome Tamir interceptor missile. The analysis uses the Cost- xchange Ratio (CER) to evaluate the economic efficiency of both sides. Results: The study's findings reveal a sharp economic asymmetry, with a single Shahed-136 estimated to cost between $20,000 and $50,000, depending on configuration, while a single Tamir interceptor missile costs approximately $40,000 to $100,000, depending on configuration. When factoring in "saturation attacks" (ordrone swarms), defense costs increase exponentially, not only through missile expenditure but also through the economic disruption caused by airstrike warnings and collateralinfrastructure damage if interceptions fail. Conclusion: The study concludes that while Iron Dome remains tactically effective in saving lives, its current economic trajectory is unsustainable against the threat of low-cost, mass-produced drones. The study suggests that to maintain strategic stability, the defense framework must transition to lower-cost interception technologies, such as directed energy weapons (lasers/Iron Beam), to neutralize the economic advantage currently held by offensive drone platforms.