Illegal levies (pungli) in the issuance of Driving Licenses (SIM) represent a recurring structural problem in the public services of the Indonesian National Police (Polri), despite more than a decade of anti-corruption regulatory efforts. Previous studies have generally examined this issue in isolation focusing on service digitalization, regulatory weaknesses, or corruption culture without offering a comprehensive analysis of the oversight system as a whole. This study aims to analyze the causes of ineffective pungli oversight in SIM issuance services from the perspective of administrative criminal law (bestuursstrafrecht), and to formulate an ideal and integrative oversight concept. A normative juridical method was employed, combining statutory, conceptual, and case approaches through an examination of relevant public service and anti-corruption regulations, as well as Pangkalpinang District Court Decision No. 52/Pid.B/2017/PN.Pgp. The analysis draws on Soekanto's legal effectiveness theory, Siagian's supervision theory, Klitgaard's anti-corruption formula, and the principles of good governance. The findings identify five major weaknesses: fragmented regulations, suboptimal internal oversight, a reactive supervision system, uneven service digitalization, and a social culture that tolerates pungli. As a solution, this study proposes a multi-layered oversight concept encompassing consistent administrative criminal law enforcement, the use of technology to strengthen oversight transparency, and integrity development for public officials, integrated through an Integrated SIM Issuance Supervision Unit. This study contributes to the development of administrative criminal law concepts in the context of Indonesian police public services.