Victory, Galant
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Pengaruh Efek Pembingkaian Terhadap Pengambilan Keputusan Divestasi Victory, Galant; Misra, Fauzan
Jurnal Ekonomi Manajemen Sistem Informasi Vol. 6 No. 4 (2025): Jurnal Ekonomi Manajemen Sistem Informasi (Maret - April 2025)
Publisher : Dinasti Review

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.38035/jemsi.v6i4.4614

Abstract

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji pengaruh framing terhadap pengambilan keputusan divestasi. Penelitian berfokus pada proses pengambilan keputusan divestasi yang diduga dipengaruhi oleh perilaku manajer/direktur sebagai pengambil keputusan. Teori prospek adalah dasar teoritis utama dalam memahami bagaimana manajer menanggapi informasi yang berkaitan dengan keuntungan dan kerugian. Efek pembingkaian mengacu pada bagaimana penyajian informasi (positif atau negatif) mempengaruhi kecenderungan untuk membuat keputusan berisiko. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan eksperimental untuk mengkaji pengaruh efek framing pada pengambilan keputusan divestasi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa efek framing secara signifikan mempengaruhi pengambilan keputusan divestasi. Informasi yang disajikan dalam bingkai positif cenderung memicu perilaku menghindari risiko, sedangkan bingkai negatif meningkatkan perilaku mencari risiko. Penelitian ini diharapkan dapat membuka pembahasan lebih lanjut tentang pengaruh faktor psikologis dan perilaku dalam pengambilan keputusan strategis yang jarang dibahas dalam penelitian di bidang akuntansi manajemen. Selain itu, penelitian ini diharapkan dapat memberikan kontribusi yang signifikan terhadap literatur akademik terkait bagaimana penyajian informasi akuntansi manajemen yang berguna untuk pengambilan keputusan.
The influence of framing effect and clawback provision on divestment decision making: An experimental study Victory, Galant; Misra, Fauzan
Journal of Accounting and Investment Vol. 27 No. 1 (2026): January 2026
Publisher : Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.18196/jai.v27i1.28865

Abstract

Research aims: This study analyzes the dual impact of framing (positive versus negative) and clawback provisions on managerial decisions regarding divestment. The study focuses on the interaction between clawback provisions, which serve as compensation-related loss cues, and externally framed accounting information, and its impact on managers’ risk attitudes regarding negative performance investments.Design/Methodology/Approach: A 2×2 between-subjects laboratory experiment was conducted with 84 participants who evaluated divestment alternatives under positive or negative frames, with or without clawback provisions.Research findings: The results indicate that framing significantly influences divestment decisions, as positive frames lead to risk-averse divestment choices, while negative frames promote risk-seeking continuation. Although clawback provisions do not exhibit a significant main effect, their interaction with framing is significant. Clawbacks increase risk-taking under positive frames but reduce risk-taking under negative frames, revealing a novel dual-framing mechanism.Theoretical contribution/Originality: This study demonstrates empirically that the behavioral consequences of clawback provisions vary depending on the framing of performance evaluation information. The study demonstrates that compensation-based loss signals interact with information framing, extending behavioral accounting research on framing effects to the area of divestment decisions in non-financial contexts.Practical implications: The results suggest that firms should better align their pay contracts with their internal reporting structures. More specifically, integrating clawback provisions with performance accomplishments articulated in positive terms may lead managers to persist in their failure to lose investments. Hence, firms and pay committees need to align the design of incentives with management reporting to contain loss-inducing risk-taking.