Khadija Touya
Sultan Moulay Slimane University

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A Game theoretic approach for competition over visibility in social networks Khadija Touya; Mohamed Baslam; Rachid El Ayachi; Mostafa Jourhmane
Bulletin of Electrical Engineering and Informatics Vol 8, No 2: June 2019
Publisher : Institute of Advanced Engineering and Science

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | Full PDF (414.586 KB) | DOI: 10.11591/eei.v8i2.728

Abstract

Social Networks have known an important evolution in the last few years. These structures, made up of individuals who are tied by one or more specific types of interdependency, constitute the window for members to express their opinions and thoughts by sending posts to their own walls or others' timelines. Actually, when a content arrives, it's located on the top of the timeline pushing away older messages. This situation causes a permanent competition over visibility among subscribers who jump on opponents to promote conflict. Our study presents this competition as a non-cooperative game; each source has to choose frequencies which assure its visibility. We model it, exploring the theory of concave games, to reach a situation of equilibrium; a situation where no player has the ultimate ability to deviate from its current strategy. We formulate the named game, then we analyze it and prove that there is exactly one Nash equilibrium which is the convergence of all players' best responses. We finally provide some numerical results, taking into consideration a system of two sources with a specific frequency space, and analyze the effect of different parameters on sources' visibility on the walls of social networks.
A Game theoretic approach for competition over visibility in social networks Khadija Touya; Mohamed Baslam; Rachid El Ayachi; Mostafa Jourhmane
Bulletin of Electrical Engineering and Informatics Vol 8, No 2: June 2019
Publisher : Institute of Advanced Engineering and Science

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | Full PDF (414.586 KB) | DOI: 10.11591/eei.v8i2.728

Abstract

Social Networks have known an important evolution in the last few years. These structures, made up of individuals who are tied by one or more specific types of interdependency, constitute the window for members to express their opinions and thoughts by sending posts to their own walls or others' timelines. Actually, when a content arrives, it's located on the top of the timeline pushing away older messages. This situation causes a permanent competition over visibility among subscribers who jump on opponents to promote conflict. Our study presents this competition as a non-cooperative game; each source has to choose frequencies which assure its visibility. We model it, exploring the theory of concave games, to reach a situation of equilibrium; a situation where no player has the ultimate ability to deviate from its current strategy. We formulate the named game, then we analyze it and prove that there is exactly one Nash equilibrium which is the convergence of all players' best responses. We finally provide some numerical results, taking into consideration a system of two sources with a specific frequency space, and analyze the effect of different parameters on sources' visibility on the walls of social networks.
A Game theoretic approach for competition over visibility in social networks Khadija Touya; Mohamed Baslam; Rachid El Ayachi; Mostafa Jourhmane
Bulletin of Electrical Engineering and Informatics Vol 8, No 2: June 2019
Publisher : Institute of Advanced Engineering and Science

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | Full PDF (414.586 KB) | DOI: 10.11591/eei.v8i2.728

Abstract

Social Networks have known an important evolution in the last few years. These structures, made up of individuals who are tied by one or more specific types of interdependency, constitute the window for members to express their opinions and thoughts by sending posts to their own walls or others' timelines. Actually, when a content arrives, it's located on the top of the timeline pushing away older messages. This situation causes a permanent competition over visibility among subscribers who jump on opponents to promote conflict. Our study presents this competition as a non-cooperative game; each source has to choose frequencies which assure its visibility. We model it, exploring the theory of concave games, to reach a situation of equilibrium; a situation where no player has the ultimate ability to deviate from its current strategy. We formulate the named game, then we analyze it and prove that there is exactly one Nash equilibrium which is the convergence of all players' best responses. We finally provide some numerical results, taking into consideration a system of two sources with a specific frequency space, and analyze the effect of different parameters on sources' visibility on the walls of social networks.
Nash equilibrium learning in non-cooperative reputation game in social networks Khadija Touya; Mohamed Baslam; Rachid El Ayachi; Mostafa Jourhmane
Indonesian Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Vol 29, No 1: January 2023
Publisher : Institute of Advanced Engineering and Science

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.11591/ijeecs.v29.i1.pp527-534

Abstract

Recently, people became more dependent on online social networks with the increasing use and the rapid development of information technology. Those environments constitute an important area where users interact and create communication ties to maintain their relationships. Furthermore, the time life of these relationships is depending on reputations of the users. Every source (information provider) has a reputation which depends on his frequency of publishing, but also the opinions given by the observers (others users) has an important impact on the determination of this reputation. Since, everyone is trying selfishly to keep a good reputation; a competition is met within these networks. This paper aims to solve this kind of competition through a game theoretic approach; we formulate the said competition as a non-cooperative game, demonstrate the uniqueness of the existent Nash Equilibrium which seems to be the convent solution in this case, then present results clarifying and illustrating the proposed modeling method.