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All Journal Dialektika kontemporer Radinka Journal of Science and Systematic Literature Review
Victor Chizi Ihunda
University of Port Harcourt
Agriculture, Biological Sciences & Forestry Computer Science & IT Decision Sciences, Operations Research & Management Mathematics Public Health Social Sciences

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Is There A Reliable Way of Knowing? I. U. Gwunireama; Victor Chizi Ihunda
Jurnal Ilmu Sosiologi Dialektika Kontemporer Volume 9, Nomor 2, Juli – December 2021
Publisher : dialektika kontemporer

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Abstract

 The human quest for knowledge is not a mere quest for information that may probably be true, but an anxious quest for certainty. What then, does it mean to know? Is knowledge possible? What are the sources of our knowledge? This paper deals with some of these recurring epistemological questions and, more precisely, the question: Is there a reliable way of knowing? To claim to know requires that the object of our knowledge is not only true but also that the source from which such a knowledge claim originates is at least reasonably reliable. Therefore, in our response to the question of the possibility of a reliable way to knowledge, we argued that it would be reasonable to think of the reliability of our sources of knowledge not in absolute terms, but comparatively and depending on the context of a given claim to knowledge, because certain sources or kinds of knowledge, if subjected to critical analysis, may simply be more reliable than others. Thus, in light of the numerous challenges associated with certain sources or kinds of knowledge, the virtue of epistemic humility demands that we acknowledge that no single source or kind of knowledge is devoid of challenges that come in the way of its reliability. This work concludes that there is no reliable way to know. Outside of that context, each of our sources of knowledge falls short of being reliable and is capable of misleading us in our quest for knowledge.
Roderick Chisholm on Reliabilism: Implications for Epistemic Indubitability Dr. Cardinal Ihejirika; Victor Chizi IHUNDA
RADINKA JOURNAL OF SCIENCE AND SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW Vol. 1 No. 3 (2023): RADINKA JOURNAL OF SCIENCE AND SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW (RJSLR)
Publisher : RADINKA JAYA UTAMA PUBLISHER

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.56778/rjslr.v1i3.169

Abstract

This paper aims at examining the pitfalls of Roderick Chisholm’s concept of reliabilism and its implications for epistemic indubility. Chisholm posits that justified belief depends on what is practically true and right for the knower to believe. He maintains that epistemic justification depends on evidence internally available to the knower and anchored his argument on the fact that we rarely have direct access to the truth of propositions, that is, to reality. Every conclusion about the epistemic status of a belief in this perspective involves a conclusion about the “legitimacy” of its source. Our paper argues that this premium Chisholm’s reliabilism places on the knowing subject’s ability to acquire knowledge through the right kind of source undermines our quest for epistemic indubitability hence, among the purposes of this study are: to examine how the reliability of a belief is dependent on the authenticity of its process of realization. It investigates what constitutes the criteria for a reliable belief and tries to resolve whether reliability is conferred on beliefs by our mere confessions. We find that a reliable belief may not after all be error free. Also that reliability invokes the skeptical question of the reliability of human knowledge. Our research which adopts the analytical method of enquiry concludes by underscoring the fact that Chisholm’s reliabilism turns the indubitable knowledge quest of philosophy into doubtful probabilities and further into full blown skepticism.
Co-Authors Dr. Cardinal Ihejirika I. U. Gwunireama