Isenyo Solomon Ogaba
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Management and Social Sciences, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

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A quest for a structural tribal formation of knowledge Isenyo Solomon Ogaba
International Journal of Humanities and Innovation (IJHI) Vol. 4 No. 1 (2021): March
Publisher : Center for Humanities and Innovation Studies

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.33750/ijhi.v4i1.106

Abstract

The cognitive view of life and the total environment that an individual holds or which is characteristic of a society's members is frequently referred to as Weltanschauung, or world view. It is thus the life scene as people look out upon it. Worldviews grow with cultures. Generations of anonymous human beings contribute to the unending quest to make the unknown knowable, to transform meaningless bafflement into meaningful understanding. There are individuals in every society, no doubt who are thinkers and systematizes, the idealists who crystallize the myths, shape the ceremonies, express the concepts in art – symbolic creators. However, even they must work within the cultural framework. The tribal people are known to have a strong worldview. The way they perform, perceive and explain the natural and supernatural phenomenon, social and cultural events, relationships within themselves and outside, and diseases and grievances reflect a manifestation of their concept of different aspects of life, often referred to as ‘worldview’. However, tribal knowledge has often been criticized as unscientific or incoherent with science, and therefore, lacks philosophical explanation. The present study, therefore, aims to investigate tribal worldviews. This paper acknowledges that since each tribal group is unique and different from one another, it is not possible to discuss their various worldviews in this paper. However, this paper attempt to x-ray basic assumption that cut across most tribal worldviews.
A Critical Analysis of Brentano’s Intentionality in Relation to Meinong’s Object Theory Isenyo Solomon Ogaba
Journal La Sociale Vol. 2 No. 5 (2021): Journal La Sociale
Publisher : Borong Newinera Publisher

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.37899/journal-la-sociale.v2i5.472

Abstract

Our thoughts are certainly about things(objects), however, what kind of things(object) are our thoughts directed at? What is the relationship between mental objects and external world object? What is the nature and character of mental and extra mental objects? An attempt at answering these meta-epistemological questions, brought to light the ideas of Franz Brentano on ‘Intentionality’ and Alexius Meinong’s Theory of object. Through proper method of philosophical analysis, it was discovered that both philosophers agreed that intentionality is a unique character exhibited by the human mind. However, Meinong went further to develop a more comprehensive object theory which attempts at clarifying some of the ontological difficulties associated with Brentano’s notion on intentionality. The research concluded that, though, both philosophers had areas of divergence and convergence in their respective epistemological thoughts, but insisted that the influence of Brentano’s ideas on Meinong cannot be overemphasized, which is to say, Meinong’s object theory, could be said to be a reaction towards the problem of referential opacity present in Brentano’s account of Intentionality.