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All Journal PINISI Discretion Review Social Sciences, Humanities and Education Journal (SHE Journal)
Chris O. Abakare
Department of Philosophy, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Ifite Road, 420110, Awka, Anambra State, NIGERIA
Humanities Decision Sciences, Operations Research & Management Economics, Econometrics & Finance Education Environmental Science Languange, Linguistic, Communication & Media Social Sciences

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THE REVIVAL OF VIRTUE ETHICS AS AN ETHICAL VIEW Chris O. Abakare
Social Sciences, Humanities and Education Journal (SHE Journal) Vol 2, No 2 (2021)
Publisher : Universitas PGRI Madiun

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.25273/she.v2i2.9331

Abstract

Aristotle and Plato were the chief architects of virtue ethics, but their own formulation of virtue ethics was mostly subdued with the appearance of consequentialism as well as Kantian deontology. However, modem thinkers have attempted to revive virtue ethics in its new form and in this regard the name which is popularly known is G.E.M. Anscombe. In fact Anscombe clearly indicates in what sense virtue ethics can be revived and what was wrong with the traditional virtue ethics as expounded by Aristotle and Plato. Anscombe points out three important issues for which traditional virtue ethics perhaps lost its glory. First, moral philosophy in general cannot survive without an adequate philosophy of psychology and this thing was absent in the traditional virtue ethics. Secondly, without psychological possibility the concepts of moral obligation and moral duty, the moral sense of ought to be jeopardized. Thirdly and importantly, the differences between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance. This task of this paper is to review the revival of virtue ethics
The Revival of Virtue Ethics As an Ethical View Chris O. Abakare
PINISI Discretion Review Volume 4, Issue 2, March 2021
Publisher : Universitas Negeri Makassar

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.26858/pdr.v4i2.20003

Abstract

Aristotle and Plato were the chief architects of virtue ethics, but their own formulation of virtue ethics was mostly subdued with the appearance of consequentialism as well as Kantian deontology. However, modem thinkers have attempted to revive virtue ethics in its new form and in this regard the name which is popularly known is G.E.M. Anscombe. In fact Anscombe clearly indicates in what sense virtue ethics can be revived and what was wrong with the traditional virtue ethics as expounded by Aristotle and Plato. Anscombe points out three important issues for which traditional virtue ethics perhaps lost its glory. First, moral philosophy in general cannot survive without an adequate philosophy of psychology and this thing was absent in the traditional virtue ethics. Secondly, without psychological possibility the concepts of moral obligation and moral duty, the moral sense of ought to be jeopardized. Thirdly and importantly, the differences between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance. This task of this paper is to review the revival of virtue ethics.
Confinement of Pregnant Women for Protection of the Unborn Chris O. Abakare
PINISI Discretion Review Volume 3, Issue 2, March 2020
Publisher : Universitas Negeri Makassar

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.26858/pdr.v1i1.20004

Abstract

The conflict between the rights of women and unborn take an ugly turn when one speaks of confinement of women for protection of their foetuses. The very thought seems perverse because we delve into the negative aspect of the rights discourse - rights are in modern times used as weapon to correct moral depravity. The relationship between the mother and her foetus, particularly the aspect of maternal care towards the unborn is more a matter of course than rights’. Thus, in case of pregnant women-foetal relationship, what essentially was a part of maternal responsibility and innate to motherhood gets reduced to rights and becomes a matter of legal duty rather than a moral responsibility. From the moral-philosophical perspective, it may be viewed as a debasement of the relationship from both sides - the mother refuses to alter her lifestyle of addiction for the sake of the unborn upon which the latter is up in arms against the former with the charge of abuse. This work maintains that the rights discourse is ill equipped to understand the problem, as law cannot be perceived as the panacea of all ills.
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