Article Per Year (5 Year)
p-Index From 2021 - 2026
0.659
P-Index
This Author published in this journals
All Journal Undang: Jurnal Hukum Mimbar Hukum Indonesia Law Review (ILREV) Jurnal Hukum dan Peradilan Jurnal Hukum dan Pembangunan
E. Fernando M. Manullang
Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia
Economics, Econometrics & Finance Environmental Science Law, Crime, Criminology & Criminal Justice

Published : 6 Documents Claim Missing Document
Claim Missing Document
Check
Articles

Found 6 Documents
Search

 1 
THE PURPOSE OF LAW, PANCASILA AND LEGALITY ACCORDING TO ERNST UTRECHT: A CRITICAL REFLECTION Manullang, Fernando Morganda
Indonesia Law Review Vol. 5, No. 2
Publisher : UI Scholars Hub

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar

Abstract

Ernst Utrecht is one of the best legal scholars Indonesia has ever had. His political views position him as an organic intellectual; a legal scholar involved in and expressing the social consciousness, both in the academic as well as in the political arena. His controversial involvement came to a tragic end, causing him to leave Indonesia for good. This article describes and reflects on some of Utrecht’s rather controversial ideas about law and politics; namely, first, “pengayoman” (guardianship) the purpose of law in Indonesia, a purpose of law which is almost completely absent from the mainstream conception of the purpose of law in contemporary legal texts, as he relates it to the idea of revolution and the teaching of Marxism, albeit taking a more critical approach. Second, Pancasila as state ethics and grundnorm, a theme which remains debated up to the present time, in spite of Kelsen’s express statement that grundnorm must be clean from non-legal elements, thus the implication of recognizing Pancasila as state ethics is that Pancasila as grundnorm loses its theoretical ground. Finally, the principle of legality, subject to Utrecht’s strong critique for reflecting the interest of those in power only. All of his above described thinking undoubtedly reaffirm Utrecht’s predicate as one of the best legal scholars Indonesia has ever had.
Misinterpretasi Ide Gustav Radbruch mengenai Doktrin Filosofis tentang Validitas dalam Pembentukan Undang-Undang E. Fernando M. Manullang
Undang: Jurnal Hukum Vol 5 No 2 (2022)
Publisher : Fakultas Hukum Universitas Jambi

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.22437/ujh.5.2.453-480

Abstract

The philosophical validity of law (keberlakuan hukum secara filosofis) is always juxtaposed with juridical and sociological aspects, and becomes a central discussion in jurisprudence. This idea has always been an integral part of every academic legislation draft, called philosophical validity (landasan filosofis). This idea was authentically conveyed by Gustav Radbruch. However, there is a philosophical misinterpretation on legal validity. It occurs because there is no explanation of neokantianism perspectives in Radbruch’s thought that Ought and Is statements are not statements as if in a separate world, but transformed as unity under the idea of legal certainty. This manifestation can be reviewed continuously from juridical, sociological and philosophical levels. In addition, the term doctrine in the concept of validity is absent, even though the term implies that validity is related to juridical doctrine (ajaran hukum). To analyse this misinterpretation, this article reflects on Radbruch’s ideas about the philosophical doctrines of validity, including juridical and sociological, and their relevance to the philosophy of neokantianism, which influenced Radbruch’s legal thought. Followed by some critical reflections on how such misinterpretation has led to serious implication in law-making. Abstrak Keberlakuan hukum secara filosofis selalu disandingkan dengan aspek yuridis dan sosiologis, dan menjadi ide sentral dalam pengetahuan hukum. Ide ini juga menjadi suatu keharusan dalam setiap penyusunan naskah akademik, dengan sebutan landasan filosofis. Ide ini sesungguhnya secara otentik disampaikan oleh Gustav Radbruch. Namun ada misinterpretasi ide keberlakuan hukum secara filosofis. Ini terjadi karena tiadanya penjelasan filosofi neokantianisme dalam pikiran Radbruch bahwa pernyataan-pernyataan yang seharusnya dan senyatanya bukanlah seperti pernyataan dalam dunia yang terpisah, melainkan menjelma ke dalam suatu kesatuan di bawah ide kepastian hukum. Penjelmaan ini dapat ditinjau secara kontinu dari segi yuridis, sosiologis dan filosofis. Di samping itu, terma doktrin dalam konsep validitas hilang, padahal terma itu memberikan implikasi bahwa validitas terkait dengan ajaran. Ini artinya suatu validitas adalah mengenai bagaimana suatu ajaran terjelma secara nyata dalam lingkup filosofis, termasuk yuridis dan sosiologis. Untuk mengurai misinterpretasi tersebut, artikel ini merefleksikan ide Radbruch tentang doktrin filosofis tentang validitas, termasuk yuridis dan sosiologis, serta merelevansikannya dengan filsafat neokantianisme, yang memengaruhi pemikiran hukum Radbruch. Dilanjutkan dengan beberapa renungan kritis tentang bagaimana misinterpretasi tersebut telah membawa implikasi yang serius dalam pembuatan undang-undang.
MEMPERTANYAKAN PANCASILA SEBAGAI GRUNDNORM: SUATU REFLEKSI KRITIS DALAM PERSPEKTIF FONDASIONALISME Manullang, E. Fernando M.
Jurnal Hukum & Pembangunan
Publisher : UI Scholars Hub

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar

Abstract

Legal scholars in Indonesia discuss whether Pancasila is grundnorm or not. Grundnorm according to Hans Kelsen is the basis for validity of legal norms. Kelsen is therefore considered a foundational scholar according to Luc J. Wintgens. Meanwhile, in the view of foundationalism, certain foundation can be accepted if such foundation becomes belief. Thus, saying that Pancasila is basic norm or not, in the view of foundationalism shall answer whether Pancasila is a belief or not. Instead of continuing the debates whether Pancasila is a grundnorm or not, this article instead takes the pre-debates stands, namely reflecting critically the question Pancasila is a grundnorm or not, as unreasonable based on a foundationalism philosophy. For Kelsen, grundnorm is merely source of validity. Kelsen rejected grundnorm containing belief, which psychological in nature, an alien element to the law. While Pancasila is philosophical value, a belief which cannot be reduced only to the validity.
SESAT PIKIR APLIKASI HERMENEUTIKA HUKUM MENURUT HANS-GEORG GADAMER Manullang, Fernando Morganda
Jurnal Hukum & Pembangunan
Publisher : UI Scholars Hub

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar

Abstract

Some legal writing written by legal scholars interpret legal text methodologically in their analysis, while seeking its philosophical foundation, namely Hans-Georg Gadamer’s legal hermeneutics. Such hermeneutics is part of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics which can be applied to law, aside from theology and philology. Such hermeneutics employs in general and on ontological level thereof. Such understanding is unknown in jurisprudence, because the interpretation in jurisprudence is more methodological, an idea that Gadamer clearly opposes. Such scholarly legal perspective potentially creates some fallacies towards Gadamer's idea on legal hermeneutics
SUBJEK HUKUM MENURUT HANS KELSEN DAN TEORI TRADISIONAL: ANTARA MANIPULASI DAN FIKSI E. Fernando M. Manullang
Jurnal Hukum dan Peradilan Vol 10, No 1 (2021)
Publisher : Pusat Strategi Kebijakan Hukum dan Peradilan Mahkamah Agung RI

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.25216/jhp.10.1.2021.139-154

Abstract

AbstrakKonsep subjek hukum adalah salahkonsep inti dalam hukum. Dalam teori tradisional, konsep ini hanya dimaknai hanya berkaitan dengan hak dan kewajiban belaka. Sementara Hans Kelsen melihat bahwa ada persoalan kuasa dalam hak dan kewajiban. Namun, kuasa ini bukanlah kuasa terutama dalam konsep subjek hukum, karena menurut teori tradisional, ada kuasa di baliknya yang menentukan sesuatu itu adalah subjek hukum yang memiliki kuasa hak atau tidak. Relasi antarkuasa ini berpotensi tidak adil, dan bahkan berpotensi menjadi jahat, karena secara potensial ada manipulasi berbaur fiksi atas nama keyakinan agama atau pandangan sosial tertentu, sehingga si penguasa ini dapat menentukan sesuatu itu adalah subjek hukum yang memiliki kuasa atau tidak. Jikalau tidak memiliki kuasa, maka sanksi akan disiapkan untuk menghukum perilaku yang dianggap menyimpang. AbstractThe concept of legal subject is one of the core concepts in law. In traditional theory, this concept is only interpreted in its relation to the rights and obligations. While Hans Kelsen sees that such concept is related to power in rights and obligations. However, this power is not the supreme power in the concept of legal subjects, because according to traditional theory, there is another power behind it which determines the existence of a legal subject whether it has power or not. This power relation is potentially unfair, and even vicious, because there is plausible manipulation mixed with fiction in the name of a religious belief or a social view, hence such power can determine whether a legal subject has power or not. If it has no power, then sanctions will be defined to punish certain behavior that is considered socially improper.
ANOMALI SEPUTAR YURISPRUDENSI: SEBUAH TELAAH ARKEOLOGIS FOUCALDIAN Manullang, E. Fernando M.
Mimbar Hukum Vol 36 No 2 (2024): Mimbar Hukum
Publisher : Faculty of Law, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.22146/mh.v36i2.11994

Abstract

Abstract Jurisprudence is understood theoretically as a judicial decision. Several opinions show a consensus that jurisprudence constitutes one of the formal sources of law, which means that jurisprudence binds like a precedent. Nevertheless, this is not the case in judicial proceedings. As a formal source of law, jurisprudence was originally stated by E. Utrecht. Another consensus about constant jurisprudence was also allegedly explained originally by Utrecht. These two notions were put forward in his books, which became the first reference written in Indonesian. Meanwhile, a Dutch law scholar, L. J. van Apeldoorn, who became a resource person for legal education from the colonial era until the early of Indonesia's independence, stated that jurisprudence is only a factor that shapes the law in lieu of a formal source of law. This article reveals in the Foucauldian archaeological approach how anomaly arises from these notions whose impacts are still being felt at present. Abstrak Yurisprudensi dipahami sebagai produk peradilan. Beberapa pernyataan menunjukkan pendapat umum yang menyatakan yurisprudensi adalah salah satu sumber hukum formil. Ini artinya yurisprudensi mengikat bagaikan preseden. Sementara faktanya di peradilan tidak demikian. Jika ditelusuri sumber awalnya, ide yurisprudensi sebagai sumber hukum formil pertama-tama disampaikan oleh E. Utrecht. Di samping itu, ada pendapat umum juga tentang yurisprudensi tetap, yang diduga secara orisinal disampaikan juga pertama kali oleh Utrecht. Dua ide ini dituangkan oleh Utrecht dalam bukunya, dan menjadi referensi pertama yang ditulis dalam bahasa Indonesia di paruh kedua abad XX hingga sekarang. Sementara di lain sisi, sarjana hukum Belanda L. J. van Apeldoorn yang menjadi referensi awal pendidikan hukum di masa kolonial hingga Indonesia merdeka, malah mengatakan yurisprudensi hanyalah faktor-faktor yang membentuk hukum, bukan sumber hukum formil. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menunjukkan secara arkeologis anomali ide yurisprudensi yang dampaknya masih berlangsung hingga kini.
Co-Authors