Bagus Dwi Ariyono
Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Published : 1 Documents Claim Missing Document
Claim Missing Document
Check
Articles

Found 1 Documents
Search

Does Institutional Ownership and Bank Monitoring Affect Agency Conflicts? Evidence from an Emerging Market Bagus Dwi Ariyono; Bowo Setiyono
Journal of Indonesian Economy and Business (JIEB) Vol 35, No 3 (2020): September
Publisher : Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.22146/jieb.53110

Abstract

Introduction/Main Objectives: This study examines the effect of institutional ownership, proxied by government and private ownership, and bank monitoring on agency conflicts. Background Problems: The previous literature focused on agency conflicts, particularly those between managers and shareholders in developed markets, with much less evidence being presented from emerging ones. Novelty: We consider the role of creditors (the banks) in mitigating agency conflicts, and the managers’ irresponsible behavior, which in previous studies has been largely under-elaborated. Research Methods: Using 1,525 observations of 305 non-financial companies that were listed in the 2011-2015 period, we employ the generalized least squares method to deal with potential econometric concern such as autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Finding/Results: We find that institutional ownership and bank monitoring, proxied by the number of banks and the share of their loans, are negatively related to agency conflicts. Conclusion: Banks and institutional ownership lead to lower agency conflicts. However, one should mitigate free-rider problems emanated from these relationships.