Yudiana Dewi Prihandini
Universitas Islam Indonesia

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Perlindungan Hukum Terhadap Pihak Ketiga Atas Perjanjian Perkawinan Yang Dibuat Setelah Perkawinan Yudiana Dewi Prihandini
Lex Renaissance Vol 4 No 2 (2019): JULI 2019
Publisher : Universitas Islam Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.20885/JLR.vol4.iss2.art9

Abstract

This study aims to formulate legal protection efforts for third parties if the marriage agreement is made after the marriage. This is derived from the Constitutional Court Decision Number 69 / PUU-XII / 2015 that defines the marriage agreement to be expandable, so that the marriage agreement is no longer interpreted only as an agreement made before the marriage (prenuptial agreement) but can also be made after the marriage takes place (postnuptial agreement). The Constitutional Court’s decision can lead to legal problems and legal uncertainty for third parties. This relates to the execution carried out by the creditor in the event of an agreement to separate property and unclear parties responsible when there is a default. This research is a normative legal study with the statutory and case approach. This study concludes, firstly, the Constitutional Court Decision Number 69 / PUU-XII / 2015 regarding marriage agreements can lead to rights and obligations and consequences for the parties. Second, in order to guarantee legal protection for third parties, the making and amendment of the marriage agreement should be carried out before a notary, made in good faith by the parties, must be recorded by the marriage registrar.
Logico-Empirisme Paradigma Positivisme Logis: Kritik Dan Tawaran Epistemologi Alternatif Nugraha, Harry Setya; Satria, Indah; Prihandini, Yudiana Dewi
Jurnal Hukum IUS QUIA IUSTUM Vol. 32 No. 3: SEPTEMBER 2025
Publisher : Fakultas Hukum Universitas Islam Indonesia

Show Abstract | Download Original | Original Source | Check in Google Scholar | DOI: 10.20885/iustum.vol32.iss3.art2

Abstract

Logico-empiricism emphasises the importance of empirical verification as a scientific criterion for distinguishing meaningful from meaningless statements. Although logico-empiricism has made significant contributions to the development of the philosophy of science and has been practically beneficial for every legal scholar, criticisms of the a variety of assumptions underlying logico-empiricism have emerged from several perspectives. Therefore, this article is important to write in order to: 1) explain and deepen the criticisms of logico-empiricism assumptions by focusing on the perspective of dogmatic legal science; 2) offer an alternative epistemology to address these criticisms. This study uses a conceptual approach supported by secondary data sources. The results show that there are six criticisms of the logico-empiricism assumptions of the logical positivism paradigm when viewed from the perspective of dogmatic legal science. These criticisms highlight the tendency of logico-empiricism to reduce legal complexity, limit the scope of explanation, generalise inappropriately, raise questions of objectivity, and ignore social, political, and societal dynamics in the formation and application of law. This critique also demonstrates the limitations of the logico-empiricist approach, necessitating a more inclusive and interdisciplinary alternative epistemology. Several alternative epistemologies proposed to address criticisms of logico-empiricism include hermeneutics, pragmatism, phenomenology, and falsificationism. It is also possible to integrate these various approaches to form a complementary methodological framework, which the author calls "critical-pragmatic hermeneutic phenomenology." This approach is advantageous because it is holistic, open to revision, contextual, practically useful, and respectful of human experience.